Parties or Nations?
Callaghan, H. and M. Höpner, APSA 2004
1
1.
Introduction
European economic integration through the removal of takeover barriers is of a
different quality than the comparatively harmless creation of a common market for goods
and services. The removal of barriers to trade in goods and services enhances competition
between member states without dictating the means by which competitiveness is
achieved. It leaves scope for the coexistence of different types of capitalism. By contrast,
the removal of barriers in the market for corporate control constitutes a direct challenge
to the internal organization of non-liberal market economies. It imposes elements of the
Anglo -American model of capitalism, thereby triggering redistribution within and
between countries. Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein made no secret of the
fact that nothing less was intended. In November 2002, he explained that
“[the trade unions] cling to traditional rights as though these were valid for ever,
regardless of economic conditions. They want to remain within the comfortable
and secure boundaries of what has been referred to as the Rhenish model of
capitalism, where stakeholders are pampered instead of shareholders, and where
consultations take place on numerous round tables. However, if Europe really
wants to become the most competitive and most modern economic area, it must
leave the comfortable setting of the Rhenish model and subject itself to the
harsher conditions of the Anglo -Saxon form of capitalism, where the rewards, but
also the risks, are higher.” (Bolkestein, 2002)
As reflected in the protracted battle over the EU takeover directive, this scheme
met with fierce political resistance. After narrating the history of the directive (section 2),
the present paper identifies the issues at stake (section 3) and investigates cleavage
patterns in the European parliament, finding systematic differences in the relative
importance of national and party group affiliation depending on the party group in
question (section 4). It concludes with a discussion of possible explanations (section 5),
theoretical implications and some afterthoughts on the future prospects of imposed or
market-driven convergence of European takeover regimes (section 6).
Convention