Author's Keywords: political economy; tax competition; tax equity; public expenditure; fiscal policy; spatial panel econometrics	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59790_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Pluemper, Thomas., Troeger, Vera. and Winner, Hannes. "Tax Competition, Budget Rigidities, and Fairness Norms" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59790_index.html>

Pluemper, T. , Troeger, V. E. and Winner, H. , 2004-09-02 "Tax Competition, Budget Rigidities, and Fairness Norms" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59790_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper analyses fiscal competition under budget rigidities and tax equity (fair-ness norms). We outline a numerically solvable political economic model that treats the outcome of tax competition as one argument in the governments utility function, the others being public expenditure and tax equity. In accordance with theoretical research, we demonstrate that tax competition tends to reduce taxes on mobile capital while increasing the tax rates on relatively immobile labor. How-ever, taxes on mobile capital do not vanish in equilibrium. Instead, the govern-ment being least restricted by budget constraints and equity norms reduces tax rates slightly below the lowest tax rates of those countries, in which governments are more constrained. Analyzing data from 21 OECD countries between 1965 and 2000 we find empirical support for our theoretical findings.

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