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Focal Points and Power Plays in Institutional Change: An Empirical Assessment
Unformatted Document Text:  Focal Points and Power Plays in Institutional Change: An Empirical Assessment Pepper D. Culpepper John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK St. Cambridge, MA 02138 ## email not listed ## August, 2004 Abstract When theories of institutional change consider ideas at all, they generally assume that all changes from one institution to another are equivalent events. This paper argues that we should expect a very different causal role for ideas in institutional change depending on the direction of that change. Focal points—conspicuous points on which actors can agree—are likely to have an independent impact on the final character of institutions adopted when actors are interdependent and trying to a move to greater institutional coordination. In such cases, institutional change requires that those actors coordinate their beliefs about each other and the effect of a new set of rules. When actors are not interdependent, institutional change in the direction of less coordination is likely to resemble a power play: an actor strengthened by an exogenous shock will trigger the collapse of old institutions and recast new ones that are closer to its preferred outcome. In such cases, ideas serve only as instruments of achieving that predetermined institutional preference. The paper considers these expectations against evidence from four cases of significant change in wage bargaining institutions since 1985: Ireland and Italy, which moved to greater coordination, and Australia and Sweden, which moved to lower coordination. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2004, Chicago, IL. Please do not cite without permission of the author.

Authors: Culpepper, Pepper.
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Focal Points and Power Plays in Institutional Change:
An Empirical Assessment
Pepper D. Culpepper
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 JFK St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
## email not listed ##
August, 2004
Abstract
When theories of institutional change consider ideas at all, they generally assume that all
changes from one institution to another are equivalent events. This paper argues that we
should expect a very different causal role for ideas in institutional change depending on
the direction of that change. Focal points—conspicuous points on which actors can
agree—are likely to have an independent impact on the final character of institutions
adopted when actors are interdependent and trying to a move to greater institutional
coordination. In such cases, institutional change requires that those actors coordinate their
beliefs about each other and the effect of a new set of rules. When actors are not
interdependent, institutional change in the direction of less coordination is likely to
resemble a power play: an actor strengthened by an exogenous shock will trigger the
collapse of old institutions and recast new ones that are closer to its preferred outcome. In
such cases, ideas serve only as instruments of achieving that predetermined institutional
preference. The paper considers these expectations against evidence from four cases of
significant change in wage bargaining institutions since 1985: Ireland and Italy, which
moved to greater coordination, and Australia and Sweden, which moved to lower
coordination.
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
September 2-5, 2004, Chicago, IL. Please do not cite without permission of the author.


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