Introduction
This paper examines the hypothesis that the role of ideas in processes of institutional
change depends on the direction of that institutional change. In cases where institutional
change denotes a move from a system that depends on coordinated interaction among
actors to one that does not, ideas as focal points will play no significant role. A collective
actor that is central to economic coordination may decide that coordination is no longer in
its interest and use ideas instrumentally to achieve a more favorable institutional setting.
Since the institutional move does not depend on other actors’ being willing to make it, it
is irrelevant whether or not their beliefs about the functioning of the world and the
motivations of other actors are shared or not. The success or failure of institutional
change will depend on whether the interested actor has the power resources required to
impose that change. Ideas may well be part of the arsenal of this actor, but its success in
changing existing institutions does not depend on whether or not competing actors come
to share those ideas.
This is not likely to be the case in situations where actors are trying to effect an
institutional change that depends on the cooperation of other, competing actors. When
actors are trying to move to an institutional arrangement that depends on the active
participation of other actors—that is, to a more coordinated equilibrium—they are far
more likely to share a set of beliefs about the functioning of the world that makes
cooperation mutually advantageous.
convergence of beliefs about the shape of the world; these beliefs underpin that
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Actors that do not share beliefs about underlying causal mechanisms can be forced by state edict to
participate in a highly coordinated system. Such a system, however, makes high and ongoing demands on
the ability of the state to supervise and enforce the participation of collective actors. We expect such
systems to be unstable over time.
Convention