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National Parliaments in the European Union: The Benefits of Integration
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9
building. During 1987 and 1988 alone, three comprehensive proposals were submitted.
11
By 1990, a majority in parliament seemed poised to pass a law.
Public mistrust still had to be won, however. Skepticism at this point came from
business as much as labor. Both feared the arbitrary application of antitrust principles on the part of a politically controlled commission. Cassola addressed those concerns by proposing the creation of an antitrust authority that would function independently of government influence. The Guarantee Authority would seek the impartial and consistent implementation of any national antitrust legislation (Wyles, 1990).
The result was the first major antitrust legislation in the country: Law 287 of 10
October 1990. Observers noted immediately that the law exhibited ‘a high degree of deference to the EEC competition rules’ (Bartocci, 1994: 547). The law opened by acknowledging Articles 81 and 82 of the TEC and the subsequent antitrust legislation (Preamble). In line with EU law, it targeted anti-competitive agreements (Article 2) and abuses of dominant positions (Article 3). The focus, however, was the national market.Hence, thresholds for notification were lowered: L 500 billion for the combined undertakings and L 50 billion for a target acquisition (both numbers were to be adjusted yearly in line with inflation) (Article 16).
12
With Law 287, the Italian parliament produced a powerful and comprehensive law in
an area hitherto void of any legislative intervention. The law proved highly consequential from the start. The Guarantee Authority became very active early on (De Nicola, 1991a; De Nicola, 1991b; Fignani, 1992). Between 1992-1994 the Authority produced 85 decisions on restrictive practices and 60 on abuses of dominant positions, while it investigated 1,421 mergers (The Economist, 1995). Highly publicized cases involved Coca Cola, airports in Rome and Milan, and Alitalia (McKay, 1999; The Economist, 1995).
Spoiling the Cartel Paradise: The Netherlands Pursue Competition Up until 1998, the Netherlands was known as a ‘cartel paradise’ (Brusse and Griffiths, 1998). Formal and informal mergers and alliances proliferated across industries. Cartels – which included market-sharing, purchasing and pricing agreements amongst firms – were legally accepted and recognized in a variety of industries ranging from transportation to banking, transport, food, retail, textile, insurance and beyond (Brown, 1996; Brusse and Griffiths, 1997: 385-387). The country’s embrace of cartels reflected a desire to protect small companies from large international competitors. It also reflected a preference – developed after World War II – for stability and social harmony (OECD, 1999: 10; Brusse and Griffiths, 1998).
The main mechanism for controlling cartels was a revered tripartite collective
bargaining forum: the Social Economic Council. An advisory body made up of union representatives, employers and laymen, the Council decided most aspects of economic and social policy, including the nature, reach and limits of anti-competitive arrangements (Brusse and Griffiths, 1998). This tripartite system was typical for the Netherlands – a
11
Legislative proposals N. 1365 of 5 August 1987, N. 102 of 10 May 1988 and N. 1240 of 26 July 1988.
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The regulation also includes restrictions and exceptions that have no parallel in EU law. These include
restrictions on the freedom of private industrial companies to acquire stakes in credit institutions (Articles 27-30), abrogated in 1993, and some protection of public and private enterprises that benefit the public.
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| | Authors: Oliver, Michael. and Duina, Francesco. |
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9
building. During 1987 and 1988 alone, three comprehensive proposals were submitted.
11
By 1990, a majority in parliament seemed poised to pass a law.
Public mistrust still had to be won, however. Skepticism at this point came from
business as much as labor. Both feared the arbitrary application of antitrust principles on
the part of a politically controlled commission. Cassola addressed those concerns by
proposing the creation of an antitrust authority that would function independently of
government influence. The Guarantee Authority would seek the impartial and consistent
implementation of any national antitrust legislation (Wyles, 1990).
The result was the first major antitrust legislation in the country: Law 287 of 10
October 1990. Observers noted immediately that the law exhibited ‘a high degree of
deference to the EEC competition rules’ (Bartocci, 1994: 547). The law opened by
acknowledging Articles 81 and 82 of the TEC and the subsequent antitrust legislation
(Preamble). In line with EU law, it targeted anti-competitive agreements (Article 2) and
abuses of dominant positions (Article 3). The focus, however, was the national market.
Hence, thresholds for notification were lowered: L 500 billion for the combined
undertakings and L 50 billion for a target acquisition (both numbers were to be adjusted
yearly in line with inflation) (Article 16).
12
With Law 287, the Italian parliament produced a powerful and comprehensive law in
an area hitherto void of any legislative intervention. The law proved highly consequential
from the start. The Guarantee Authority became very active early on (De Nicola, 1991a;
De Nicola, 1991b; Fignani, 1992). Between 1992-1994 the Authority produced 85
decisions on restrictive practices and 60 on abuses of dominant positions, while it
investigated 1,421 mergers (The Economist, 1995). Highly publicized cases involved
Coca Cola, airports in Rome and Milan, and Alitalia (McKay, 1999; The Economist,
1995).
Spoiling the Cartel Paradise: The Netherlands Pursue Competition
Up until 1998, the Netherlands was known as a ‘cartel paradise’ (Brusse and Griffiths,
1998). Formal and informal mergers and alliances proliferated across industries. Cartels –
which included market-sharing, purchasing and pricing agreements amongst firms – were
legally accepted and recognized in a variety of industries ranging from transportation to
banking, transport, food, retail, textile, insurance and beyond (Brown, 1996; Brusse and
Griffiths, 1997: 385-387). The country’s embrace of cartels reflected a desire to protect
small companies from large international competitors. It also reflected a preference –
developed after World War II – for stability and social harmony (OECD, 1999: 10;
Brusse and Griffiths, 1998).
The main mechanism for controlling cartels was a revered tripartite collective
bargaining forum: the Social Economic Council. An advisory body made up of union
representatives, employers and laymen, the Council decided most aspects of economic
and social policy, including the nature, reach and limits of anti-competitive arrangements
(Brusse and Griffiths, 1998). This tripartite system was typical for the Netherlands – a
11
Legislative proposals N. 1365 of 5 August 1987, N. 102 of 10 May 1988 and N. 1240 of 26 July 1988.
12
The regulation also includes restrictions and exceptions that have no parallel in EU law. These include
restrictions on the freedom of private industrial companies to acquire stakes in credit institutions
(Articles 27-30), abrogated in 1993, and some protection of public and private enterprises that benefit the
public.
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