 |
Finance and Trade: Issue Linkage and the Enforcement of International Debt Contracts
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Finance and Trade: Issue Linkage and the
Enforcement of International Debt Contracts
Michael Tomz
Stanford University
August 2004
Abstract: In many models of international debt, lenders deter default by linking finance and trade: they threaten to impose commercial sanctions on countries that refuse to pay. This paper assesses the importance of linkage in debtor-creditor relations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I derive and test many implications of the linkage theory, but find almost no evidence of an enforcement strategy that connects debt with trade. Given these findings, the field should shift its theoretical and empirical focus from linkage to other mechanisms, such as reputation, that encourage countries to repay and give investors the confidence to lend. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 2004. Contact: Department of Political Science, Stanford, CA 94305-6044, email ## email not listed ##.
|
| |
| |
|
|
Finance and Trade: Issue Linkage and the
Enforcement of International Debt Contracts
Michael Tomz
Stanford University
August 2004
Abstract: In many models of international debt, lenders deter default by linking finance and
trade: they threaten to impose commercial sanctions on countries that refuse to pay. This paper
assesses the importance of linkage in debtor-creditor relations during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. I derive and test many implications of the linkage theory, but find almost no
evidence of an enforcement strategy that connects debt with trade. Given these findings, the
field should shift its theoretical and empirical focus from linkage to other mechanisms, such as
reputation, that encourage countries to repay and give investors the confidence to lend.
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, August 2004. Contact: Department of Political Science, Stanford, CA 94305-6044,
email ## email not listed ##.
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Page 1 of 55 
