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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59948_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Rector, Chad. "Second-Image Theories of Unipolarity and Institutions for Self-restraint" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59948_index.html>

Rector, C. , 2004-09-02 "Second-Image Theories of Unipolarity and Institutions for Self-restraint" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59948_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Dominant states in hierarchic relationships have a long-term interest in committing to moderate behavior in order to dissuade subordinate states from resisting their pre-eminence, but these dominant states may be tempted to use their dominance to extort short-term gains. Self-restraint must therefore figure prominently in any theory of hierarchy. The ability of a dominant state (or empire or, in the extreme case, a unipolar state) to resist the temptation to exploit a subordinate can be influenced by the economic interests of the dominant state’s ruling coalition. In particular, promises of self-restraint are more credible if the interests of groups that have specific investments in the subordinate state have a veto over policy decisions that relate to how the dominant state governs its colonies. A comparison of British Imperial institutions in colonial governance crises with North America in the 18th century and Australia in the 19th suggests that subordinate states were more willing to accept unequal, hierarchic relationships when interest groups with a particular interest in the persistence of the relationship – even though these groups have no interest in the well-being of the subordinate state per se – held positions of influence in the imperial government.

Delegated Empire: Information, Networks, and Political Control of the American Colonial State in the Philippines, 1900-1913

Schizophrenic Governance and Fostering Global Inequalities in the British Empire: The UK Domestic State Versus the Indian and African Colonies, 1890-1960