19
relationship with the colony.
17
V’s specific investments are large from V’s perspective,
even though they may be small in relation to the interests of the empire in the aggregate.
The empire is formally led by a group or individual E who, as before, has an undistorted
interest in the welfare of the empire as a whole. E, however, cannot unilaterally make
policy, and cannot override V’s vetoes of E’s decisions.
When the leader of this second kind of empire, one with a group V in it, makes a
promise like “if you join with us I will guarantee that you will receive a share of the
benefits, etc.” (i.e. not be exploited) the presence of V makes this promise believable.
Suppose the colony joins the empire and makes large specific investments in the
relationship. V also makes specific investments that are valuable to V, even if they are
inconsequential to E. Once C is committed, E may wish to reopen negotiations.
However, since V has a veto over any move E makes in bargaining, and V’s preferences
(that is, the high costs it pays if bargaining fails) make it conciliatory, in effect C is
negotiating with V.
18
The deal C gets under the second kind of empire is better than the deal it gets with
the first kind. All else equal, V’s presence reduces the likelihood that C will end up with
a deal that makes it worse off than it would have been had it never been a part of the
empire in the first place.
To clarify, I am not suggesting that V takes C’s side in negotiations, or in any way
sympathizes with the colony’s desires for a share of the benefits of empire. Quite the
contrary: I assume that just like E as a whole, V would also benefit from a policy that
exploited C for E’s benefit. The only thing setting V apart from E is that V has much to
lose (that it, much costly adjusting to do) if the relationship ends. V is as vulnerable as C.
This mutual vulnerability makes the relationship more equal when they bargain, since
both sides would be hurt equally if negotiations broke down and the relationship ended.
In summary, the promises an empire makes to engage in self- restraint, and
therefore its success in ensuring the loyalty of a colony, are more credible when that
empire has within it a group invested in the relationship with the colony and that has a
veto over colonial policy. This group need not have the colony’s best interests at heart; it
need only have something to lose if the empire dissolves.
This argument is related to, but somewhat different from, some others have
argued about the sources of imperial over-extension and self-restraint. Jack Snyder posits
that over-extension is the result of a narrow group of particular interests capturing the
state and log-rolling in order to produce more imperial expansion than any one of the m
individually would prefer (Snyder 1991). Self-restraint, in his view, is ensured by
political systems that are broadly representative of multiple groups in society – that is,
those that resist logrolls. That is, a particularistic special interest group is not necessary
for self-restraint; a leader who provides public goods for society broadly is sufficient.
My argument suggests nearly the opposite. A fractured political system may be best for
imperial self-restraint if it gives veto power to minority groups whose interests just
17
A veto-player (Tsebelis 1999) is any individual or group that has the ability to prevent a policy change.
A veto-player, therefore, will only allow a new policy to take effect if it values that new policy at least as
much as it values the status quo.
18
Some recent literature proceeds from the assumption that one state has “hawks” and “doves” and shows
how bargaining outcomes with a foreign state are affected by different sets of preferences or institutional
arrangements (Milner 1997; Mayer 1998). I do not assume any particular structure to the bargaining game.
Convention