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Second-Image Theories of Unipolarity and Institutions for Self-restraint
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Kimberley noted publicly that bargaining hard would be counterproductive since
it would push the colonies closer to severing the relationship themselves. His adversaries, among them some Tories in the House of Lords (but, importantly, not ones that had been in the Colonial Office during Disraeli’s administrations; they supported the decision since they too had strong ties to financial interests that would be put at risk if the relationship with Australia soured) argued that the stakes were high enough that the empire should make a stand. The more risk-averse Colonial Office, however, carried the day. The institutional prerogatives of the financial interests that were represented by the Office gave them the ability to control the relationship with the colonies (Gladstone 1982, p. 496).
The particular incident over preferential trade agreements among the colonies is
not intrinsically important. What is important is that the way it was resolved had every reason to give the Australians confidence that whatever government was in power in London would respect their interests. This respect would not come because the financial groups in the City had Australia’s best interests at heart (they were, after all, multinational corporations that themselves had interests in extracting wealth from the colonies, and would have ideally preferred British trade preferences implemented over colonial preferences if they could have been implemented without risking a rupture in the overall relationship). Rather, this respect came because they valued the continuation of the relationship just as much as the Australians did. With political institutions in London that made the value of relationship-specific assets relatively equal, Australians were assured that they would not be pushed to ruinous exploitation in the future. As a result, there was never an Australian declaration of independence.
4.
Conclusion.
The empirical evidence presented here is exploratory, but suggests the potential
for a research program that explores how empires commit to self-restraint. The history of the British Empire, with its early failure in America and later successes in Australia and elsewhere, strongly indicates that the domestic institutional features of imperial states are a necessary part of any complete theory of hierarchy – or, in the extreme case, unipolarity – in international relations. References: Allin, C. D. and W. Anderson (1929). Australasian preferential tariffs and imperial free
trade a chapter in the fiscal emancipation of the colonies. Minneapolis,.
Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. Beach, W. G. (1899). "The Australian Federal Constitution." Political Science Quarterly
14(4): 663-680.
Bowen, C. D. (1974). The most dangerous man in America: scenes from the life of
Benjamin Franklin. Boston,, Little Brown.
Buchan, B. (2000). The Government of Peace: Liberal Civilisation and the Problem of
Violence. Political Science. Canberra, Australian National University.
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29
Kimberley noted publicly that bargaining hard would be counterproductive since
it would push the colonies closer to severing the relationship themselves. His
adversaries, among them some Tories in the House of Lords (but, importantly, not ones
that had been in the Colonial Office during Disraeli’s administrations; they supported the
decision since they too had strong ties to financial interests that would be put at risk if the
relationship with Australia soured) argued that the stakes were high enough that the
empire should make a stand. The more risk-averse Colonial Office, however, carried the
day. The institutional prerogatives of the financial interests that were represented by the
Office gave them the ability to control the relationship with the colonies (Gladstone 1982,
p. 496).
The particular incident over preferential trade agreements among the colonies is
not intrinsically important. What is important is that the way it was resolved had every
reason to give the Australians confidence that whatever government was in power in
London would respect their interests. This respect would not come because the financial
groups in the City had Australia’s best interests at heart (they were, after all,
multinational corporations that themselves had interests in extracting wealth from the
colonies, and would have ideally preferred British trade preferences implemented over
colonial preferences if they could have been implemented without risking a rupture in the
overall relationship). Rather, this respect came because they valued the continuation of
the relationship just as much as the Australians did. With political institutions in London
that made the value of relationship-specific assets relatively equal, Australians were
assured that they would not be pushed to ruinous exploitation in the future. As a result,
there was never an Australian declaration of independence.
4.
Conclusion.
The empirical evidence presented here is exploratory, but suggests the potential
for a research program that explores how empires commit to self-restraint. The history of
the British Empire, with its early failure in America and later successes in Australia and
elsewhere, strongly indicates that the domestic institutional features of imperial states are
a necessary part of any complete theory of hierarchy – or, in the extreme case, unipolarity
– in international relations.
References:
Allin, C. D. and W. Anderson (1929). Australasian preferential tariffs and imperial free
trade a chapter in the fiscal emancipation of the colonies. Minneapolis,.
Baldwin, D. A. (1985). Economic statecraft. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
Beach, W. G. (1899). "The Australian Federal Constitution." Political Science Quarterly
14(4): 663-680.
Bowen, C. D. (1974). The most dangerous man in America: scenes from the life of
Benjamin Franklin. Boston,, Little Brown.
Buchan, B. (2000). The Government of Peace: Liberal Civilisation and the Problem of
Violence. Political Science. Canberra, Australian National University.
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