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Second-Image Theories of Unipolarity and Institutions for Self-restraint
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behavior that preserves the system, and the system is relatively robust since the overall balance does not, ex ante, depend upon the behavior of any one particular state.
The critical behavior that preserves a unipolar system, ensuring its stability, is
self-restraint by the dominant state. If a dominant state does not restrain itself, other states will form a coalition to oppose it, thereby replacing a unipolar system with one that is (at least) bipolar. So, predicting or understanding the stability of a unipolar system requires predicting or understanding the characteristics and behavior of one particular state. We are therefore unlikely to be as satisfied with any purely third- image theory of unipolarity as we were with purely third- image theories of multipolarity.
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Making self- restraint credible.
Weak states face a dilemma when deciding whether or not to ally themselves with
a stronger partner. Many traditional ideas about the dangers of allying with a strong power assume that resistance to a stronger partner now is easier than resistance later. A general way of thinking about this is that if the weak state joins with the strong state in the present, then in the future it must pay some adjustment cost if it leaves the relationship. That is, once joined, leaving an Empire is costly in ways that go beyond simply the benefits of membership forgone. Suppose that there were no such adjustment cost. Then, states would join an empire and then simply leave if ever the costs of membership began to outweigh the benefits. Joining would never be worse than not joining; an easy exit option eliminates any downside risk.
When a weaker state joins with a stronger state, it usually gives up some of its
autonomy in exchange for the benefits of cooperation with a wealthier and more powerful partner. Following David Lake’s formulation (Lake 1999; Lake 2002), authority relationships between states are pervasive in international politics, de facto if not de jure. I therefore use “hierarchy” or “empire” to refer to a relationship between a dominant and subordinate state in which the subordinate state cedes control, or partial control, of policy to the dominant one. In the rest of this section, I will refer to the “dominant state” or “empire” or “imperial state” equivalently as a state that has this sort of relationship with a “subordinate state” or “colony.” I am using these terms loosely here to refer to a range of authority relationships.
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Critics of neorealism seldom argued that second -image arguments, dealing with characteristics of
particular states, were necessary in order to support the conclusion that states tend to balance. They generally conceded the point that the nature of the system itself was enough to induce enough balancing behavior to preserve the stability of the system, given certain assumptions about the system itself. It was these assumptions, such as self-help, that were generally questioned (Keohane 1984; Wendt 1999).
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A possible counter-argument here is that perhaps in the modern era there is one particular trait that is a
prerequisite for a state to have in order to achieve dominant status in the world. Suppose, for the sake of argument, two (dubious) premises: no state can be globally dominant unless it is a free-trading democracy, and free-trading democracies are inherently highly capable of committing to self-restraint. Logically, then, any future dominant state in a unipolar system will be capable of exercising self-restraint. Of course, any unipolar system that we actually observe should be led by a state that can credibly commit to self -restraint, since, if it could not, the system never would have arisen in the first place, and therefore we would never have observed it. Such arguments rely on assumptions about the internal workings of states, even though they do not need to identify states by name, so whether to call such theories purely third -image or not is a theological question.
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behavior that preserves the system, and the system is relatively robust since the overall
balance does not, ex ante, depend upon the behavior of any one particular state.
The critical behavior that preserves a unipolar system, ensuring its stability, is
self-restraint by the dominant state. If a dominant state does not restrain itself, other
states will form a coalition to oppose it, thereby replacing a unipolar system with one that
is (at least) bipolar. So, predicting or understanding the stability of a unipolar system
requires predicting or understanding the characteristics and behavior of one particular
state. We are therefore unlikely to be as satisfied with any purely third- image theory of
unipolarity as we were with purely third- image theories of multipolarity.
23
2.
Making self- restraint credible.
Weak states face a dilemma when deciding whether or not to ally themselves with
a stronger partner. Many traditional ideas about the dangers of allying with a strong
power assume that resistance to a stronger partner now is easier than resistance later. A
general way of thinking about this is that if the weak state joins with the strong state in
the present, then in the future it must pay some adjustment cost if it leaves the
relationship. That is, once joined, leaving an Empire is costly in ways that go beyond
simply the benefits of membership forgone. Suppose that there were no such adjustment
cost. Then, states would join an empire and then simply leave if ever the costs of
membership began to outweigh the benefits. Joining would never be worse than not
joining; an easy exit option eliminates any downside risk.
When a weaker state joins with a stronger state, it usually gives up some of its
autonomy in exchange for the benefits of cooperation with a wealthier and more powerful
partner. Following David Lake’s formulation (Lake 1999; Lake 2002), authority
relationships between states are pervasive in international politics, de facto if not de jure.
I therefore use “hierarchy” or “empire” to refer to a relationship between a dominant and
subordinate state in which the subordinate state cedes control, or partial control, of policy
to the dominant one. In the rest of this section, I will refer to the “dominant state” or
“empire” or “imperial state” equivalently as a state that has this sort of relationship with a
“subordinate state” or “colony.” I am using these terms loosely here to refer to a range of
authority relationships.
2
Critics of neorealism seldom argued that second -image arguments, dealing with characteristics of
particular states, were necessary in order to support the conclusion that states tend to balance. They
generally conceded the point that the nature of the system itself was enough to induce enough balancing
behavior to preserve the stability of the system, given certain assumptions about the system itself. It was
these assumptions, such as self-help, that were generally questioned (Keohane 1984; Wendt 1999).
3
A possible counter-argument here is that perhaps in the modern era there is one particular trait that is a
prerequisite for a state to have in order to achieve dominant status in the world. Suppose, for the sake of
argument, two (dubious) premises: no state can be globally dominant unless it is a free-trading democracy,
and free-trading democracies are inherently highly capable of committing to self-restraint. Logically, then,
any future dominant state in a unipolar system will be capable of exercising self-restraint. Of course, any
unipolar system that we actually observe should be led by a state that can credibly commit to self -restraint,
since, if it could not, the system never would have arisen in the first place, and therefore we would never
have observed it. Such arguments rely on assumptions about the internal workings of states, even though
they do not need to identify states by name, so whether to call such theories purely third -image or not is a
theological question.
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