 |
Second-Image Theories of Unipolarity and Institutions for Self-restraint
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
9
allocation of gains, such as when market forces distribute wealth among members of a common market, states can demand or offer side-payments in order to compensate, bribe, or extort. Most goods are themselves divisible, so that, for example, states can allocate among themselves the costs of military preparations for common defense, but even when they are not they can be linked to other issues that are (Fearon 1995).
Once they are already in a relationship together, and a colony is vulnerable to
high adjustment costs if the relationship ends but the empire is not, the empire can use the threat of ending the relationship in order to take a larger share of the joint gains to itself. Indeed, it may be impossible for the empire to refrain from doing so. If the potential losses a subordinate state faces from adjustment costs are high enough, the dominant state may even be able to extort more from the subordinate state than the subordinate state ever gained from joint production in the first place.
The most obvious form of extortion may be economic. An empire may use its
unequal bargaining power to extract money from the colony, in the form of taxes or industrial production (Liberman 1996). Other forms of extortion are more difficult to measure but may be at least as common. Empires can use threats and promises to get their colonies to behave in ways that are beneficial for the empire and detrimental for the colonies in ways other than a simple financial transfer. Examples here would include providing support for a military or diplomatic venture that harms (or at least does not benefit) the colony but enriches the empire, or conforming to the cultural conventions of the empire in order to suit the empire’s citizens (e.g. converting to a dominant religion).
This form of exploitation is possible because of the potential adjustment costs that
arise from the colony’s investment in relationship-specific assets. When a state has to decide whether or not to join with an empire, or a colony has to decide whether or not to deepen an existing relationship with an empire, it must calculate what share of the joint gains it will get knowing that its share of the joint gains will depend upon whatever bargaining power it has with the empire in the division of gains. Its bargaining power, and, inversely, the empire’s bargaining power, will depend on the extent to which joint production will lead it to make relationship-specific investments versus the extent to which joint production will lead the empire to make relationship-specific investments. These are both prospective judgments, since these investments will create hostages in the future; these hostages create the potential for extortion when the empire and colony divide gains in the future.
For this reason, it may be quite sensible for a state to decline to join with a
potentially dominant state or empire even when the potential joint gains are large, and even when the state’s own potential negotiated share of the gains initially would be large. It may also be sensible for an existing colony of an empire to choose to leave if it perceived that, in the future, the value of its relationship-specific assets was going to increase, putting it more at risk of exploitation. If the potential for exploitation is great enough – that is, if the magnitude and inequality of the potential adjustment costs are great enough – then the state will be better off forgoing the benefits of membership in the empire and pursue a self-sufficient path. Even if leaving an empire, or staying out in the first place, is costly for other reasons (such as coercion or punishment from the empire), the subordinate state might still be better off pursuing independence as long as the future costs of being exploited outweigh the present costs of leaving or staying out.
|
| |
| |
|
|
9
allocation of gains, such as when market forces distribute wealth among members of a
common market, states can demand or offer side-payments in order to compensate, bribe,
or extort. Most goods are themselves divisible, so that, for example, states can allocate
among themselves the costs of military preparations for common defense, but even when
they are not they can be linked to other issues that are (Fearon 1995).
Once they are already in a relationship together, and a colony is vulnerable to
high adjustment costs if the relationship ends but the empire is not, the empire can use the
threat of ending the relationship in order to take a larger share of the joint gains to itself.
Indeed, it may be impossible for the empire to refrain from doing so. If the potential
losses a subordinate state faces from adjustment costs are high enough, the dominant state
may even be able to extort more from the subordinate state than the subordinate state ever
gained from joint production in the first place.
The most obvious form of extortion may be economic. An empire may use its
unequal bargaining power to extract money from the colony, in the form of taxes or
industrial production (Liberman 1996). Other forms of extortion are more difficult to
measure but may be at least as common. Empires can use threats and promises to get
their colonies to behave in ways that are beneficial for the empire and detrimental for the
colonies in ways other than a simple financial transfer. Examples here would include
providing support for a military or diplomatic venture that harms (or at least does not
benefit) the colony but enriches the empire, or conforming to the cultural conventions of
the empire in order to suit the empire’s citizens (e.g. converting to a dominant religion).
This form of exploitation is possible because of the potential adjustment costs that
arise from the colony’s investment in relationship-specific assets. When a state has to
decide whether or not to join with an empire, or a colony has to decide whether or not to
deepen an existing relationship with an empire, it must calculate what share of the joint
gains it will get knowing that its share of the joint gains will depend upon whatever
bargaining power it has with the empire in the division of gains. Its bargaining power,
and, inversely, the empire’s bargaining power, will depend on the extent to which joint
production will lead it to make relationship-specific investments versus the extent to
which joint production will lead the empire to make relationship-specific investments.
These are both prospective judgments, since these investments will create hostages in the
future; these hostages create the potential for extortion when the empire and colony
divide gains in the future.
For this reason, it may be quite sensible for a state to decline to join with a
potentially dominant state or empire even when the potential joint gains are large, and
even when the state’s own potential negotiated share of the gains initially would be large.
It may also be sensible for an existing colony of an empire to choose to leave if it
perceived that, in the future, the value of its relationship-specific assets was going to
increase, putting it more at risk of exploitation. If the potential for exploitation is great
enough – that is, if the magnitude and inequality of the potential adjustment costs are
great enough – then the state will be better off forgoing the benefits of membership in the
empire and pursue a self-sufficient path. Even if leaving an empire, or staying out in the
first place, is costly for other reasons (such as coercion or punishment from the empire),
the subordinate state might still be better off pursuing independence as long as the future
costs of being exploited outweigh the present costs of leaving or staying out.
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
