requirements for entry that might “screen” out states that are unlikely subsequently to comply.
2
These agreements rarely possess their own legal structure for citizens to file complaints against
their own governments (Hathaway 2003, 1834), and external enforcement is minimal or nonexistent
(Moravcsik 2000, 217). If human rights regimes rarely have any “teeth” of their own, why would
states comply with them?
I argue that a government’s decision to commit to a human rights regime that does not have
“teeth” of its own depends in large part on its expectation that the agreement will be enforced
domestically. In democracies, where citizens benefit from rights and legal/institutional channels
with which to hold governments accountable for their international commitments, governments
will ratify human rights agreements only when they are relatively compliant. Non-democracies do
not face the threat of domestic enforcement or punishment, and therefore the extent of compliant
behavior will bear little relevance to their decision to ratify. This has important implications for
subsequent treaty compliance. Democracies, I argue, keep their international promises – in large
part because they make promises they know they can keep. There is little reason, however, to
believe that ratification alone should improve the human rights practices of non-democracies, and
if we follow Hathaway’s (2002) logic, it may even contribute to their worsening.
I explore the above propositions empirically by examining ratification of and compliance with
the International Labor Organization’s Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment (MAC) and the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value (ERC). The ILO has designated these agreements among its
eight fundamental conventions, because they cover the fundamental human rights of abolition of
child labor and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment/occupation, respectively
(ILO 2004c).
3
This paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, I survey the literature on international
law and compliance, focusing in particular on relevant research in the area of human rights. In
2
See von Stein forthcoming.
3
To date, the ILO has created 185 conventions. The other fundamental conventions are as follows: The Con-
vention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; The Convention Concerning
the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively; The Convention Concerning
Forced or Compulsory Labor; The Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor; The Convention Concern-
ing Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation; and The Convention Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (ILO 2004b).
2
Convention