HAWES, p.4
Yet, international politics is not static—in fact, it is quite dynamic—and the
institutional stickiness of international organizations (Keohane 1984) can lead to
increasing disparities between the original intentions of the organization's creators
regarding the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, and the distribution in practice.
There are three primary types of changes that IOs can experience in this regard: 1) a
change in the number of members, thus affecting the preference aggregation mechanism,
2) a shift in the members' preferences, or 3) a shift in the relative distribution of geo-
political power between member-states. Any of these changes can create ever-larger
disparities between states relative power, and their share of the distributional effects of
the IO's policies.
The potential for these unintended shifts is inherent in nearly all forms of
institutionalized international cooperation. States enter into these organizations with the
intention of getting a certain share of authority and benefits, yet the changing nature of
politics, and the rigidity of IO's rules and procedures can lead to a shift away from these
expected benefits. Thus, it would seem that if states are not careful, delegation to
international organizations can ultimately result in the organization being turned against
the interests of its most powerful members.
Realist theories of international relations have long pointed out the potential for
the rules-based nature of IOs to be turn against their more powerful member-states, and
have cautioned against over-eager participation in these IOs as a result. Yet, in spite of
these precautionary warnings, states (even powerful ones) are expanding their
participation in IOs at a surprising rate. If our assumption that states act rationally is
correct, then powerful states must know that, faced with the potential for future
Convention