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reasons that it is more tempting to blackmail a rich person than a poor one. The question
is: how can a weak state gain sufficient leverage over the United States so that the latter
will give in to its demands?
In order to force the United States to “pay up,” a potential blackmailer has to meet
several conditions.
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First, the blackmailing state must be able to take some action that
the United States regards as dangerous or threatening; in other words, the blackmailer
must have the capacity to harm U.S. interests. Second, the threat must be at least
somewhat credible; i.e., U.S. leaders must believe that there is some reasonable chance
that that blackmailer might execute the threat if they did not comply. If executing the
threat would be equally harmful to the blackmailer and the victim, then the threat is less
credible and less likely to work.
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By contrast, if carrying out the threat would be in the
blackmailer’s interest no matter what the United States did, then the threat will be quite
credible and more likely to trigger U.S. concessions. Third, the threatened action must be
one that the United States cannot easily prevent via other means. A victim threatened
with the exposure of embarrassing evidence (such as compromising photographs) could
try to steal the photographs. If this strategy worked, the blackmailer’s leverage would
evaporate. Similarly, the United States will not have to make concessions if it can use its
own capabilities to prevent a blackmailing state from carrying out its threat, unless
meeting the blackmailer’s demands would be easier and cheaper.
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Finally, the
blackmailer must be able to convince U.S. leaders that threat will disappear once the
demands are met. If a potential victim believes that giving in will encourage repeated
demands, then giving in may be less attractive than rejecting the demand and suffering
the consequences.
Thus, weak states can successfully employ a strategy of blackmail when a) they
have the ability to do something that the United States does not want, b) the United States
cannot easily prevent it, c) their demands are not too large, and d) the United States has
reason to believe that complying with the blackmailer’s demands will in fact prevent the
threat from being carried out.
Since the Cold War ended, the undisputed world champion in the category
“effective use of blackmail” is undoubtedly North Korea. North Korea is a tragic failure
by most standards: its per capita income is only $1000 per year; it is increasingly isolated
diplomatically, its people are exposed to recurring famines, and it remains a brutally
repressive dictatorship. By contrast, South Korea is a modern industrial power and has
gradually moved towards full-fledged democracy. Although North Korea still maintains
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The classic analysis remains Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, (1968); and see also Robert Jervis, “Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics,” in J.
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Coercion, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972.
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A threat would harm both blackmailer and victim can still exert some leverage, if the blackmailer can
convince the target that it is more willing to bear the costs of executing the threat. If the blackmailer seems
highly resolved and the target fears the consequences more than the blackmailer does, then a seemingly
“irrational” threat can still work.
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The costs of paying off a blackmailer include both the immediate costs of meeting the demand and the
potential damage to one’s reputation. If a state is worried that giving in to blackmail will encourage others
to issue threats of their own, it might decide to reject the demand (and pay the larger price) in order to deter
future attempts at extortion.
Convention