 |
Can the United States Be Balanced? If So, How?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
2
INTRODUCTION
As President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic led a country whose population was
three percent the size of the U.S. total, with a GNP .2 percent that of the United States, and which spent roughly $1.6 billion on defense (compared with $271 billion for the United States). Yet Milosevic did not seem intimidated by his Lilliputian stature. When U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke met with Milosevic in October 1998 to negotiate over the status of Kosovo, Holbrooke tried to impress Milosevic by bringing along Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, who would command the air war against Serbia. At their first meeting, Milosevic greeted Short by remarking: “So you are the man who is going to bomb me.” And when Short told the Serbian President that he had “U2s in one hand and B-52s in the other, and the choice [of which I use] is up to you,” Milosevic “just sort of nodded.” Milosevic was given a detailed briefing describing what NATO’s air campaign would do to Serbia, but he ultimately rejected NATO’s proposals and chose to face war instead.
1
This story reminds us that some states sometimes choose to resist U.S. primacy.
Countries that align with the United States are sometimes vexing for U.S. policymakers, and some U.S. allies are able to manipulate Washington into doing more of what they want and less of what Americans might prefer. On balance, however, states who see US power as an asset, who regard U.S. primacy as broadly beneficial, and who are willing to align their foreign policies with ours on most issues are unlikely to pose significant threats to US interests or cause major headaches for U.S. policymakers.
Instead, the more serious problems arise from states who are reluctant to embrace
Pax Americana, and especially from those who feel threatened by American primacy and who would like to find ways to keep American power in check. If the United States cannot make its position of primacy palatable to others, the number of countries in this category will grow. Although none of these states is strong enough to challenge the US directly—even when backed by others—a world in which most states are wary of the United States will be a more contentious and unpleasant place.
States that seek to oppose U.S. power do so for three main reasons. First, and
most obviously, states that regard the United States as fundamentally hostile—and whose basic interests are at odds with ours—will reject alignment with the United States and are likely to adopt a policy of open defiance. The obvious examples here are the so-called “rogue states” singled out by the Clinton Administration, or the “axis of evil” identified by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech.
Second, some states may oppose U.S. policy on a limited set of issues, while
trying to maintain good relations with Washington in other areas. As long as the differences do not become too great, these frictions are part of the normal give-and-take of international life. Even in these relatively benign contexts, however, other countries
1
Interview available at
www.pbs.org/wgbh.pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interview.short.html
. For
background, see Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War for Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).
|
| |
| |
|
|
2
INTRODUCTION
As President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic led a country whose population was
three percent the size of the U.S. total, with a GNP .2 percent that of the United States,
and which spent roughly $1.6 billion on defense (compared with $271 billion for the
United States). Yet Milosevic did not seem intimidated by his Lilliputian stature. When
U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke met with Milosevic in October 1998 to negotiate over
the status of Kosovo, Holbrooke tried to impress Milosevic by bringing along Air Force
Lieutenant General Michael Short, who would command the air war against Serbia. At
their first meeting, Milosevic greeted Short by remarking: “So you are the man who is
going to bomb me.” And when Short told the Serbian President that he had “U2s in one
hand and B-52s in the other, and the choice [of which I use] is up to you,” Milosevic “just
sort of nodded.” Milosevic was given a detailed briefing describing what NATO’s air
campaign would do to Serbia, but he ultimately rejected NATO’s proposals and chose to
face war instead.
1
This story reminds us that some states sometimes choose to resist U.S. primacy.
Countries that align with the United States are sometimes vexing for U.S. policymakers,
and some U.S. allies are able to manipulate Washington into doing more of what they
want and less of what Americans might prefer. On balance, however, states who see US
power as an asset, who regard U.S. primacy as broadly beneficial, and who are willing to
align their foreign policies with ours on most issues are unlikely to pose significant
threats to US interests or cause major headaches for U.S. policymakers.
Instead, the more serious problems arise from states who are reluctant to embrace
Pax Americana, and especially from those who feel threatened by American primacy and
who would like to find ways to keep American power in check. If the United States
cannot make its position of primacy palatable to others, the number of countries in this
category will grow. Although none of these states is strong enough to challenge the US
directly—even when backed by others—a world in which most states are wary of the
United States will be a more contentious and unpleasant place.
States that seek to oppose U.S. power do so for three main reasons. First, and
most obviously, states that regard the United States as fundamentally hostile—and whose
basic interests are at odds with ours—will reject alignment with the United States and
are likely to adopt a policy of open defiance. The obvious examples here are the so-
called “rogue states” singled out by the Clinton Administration, or the “axis of evil”
identified by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union speech.
Second, some states may oppose U.S. policy on a limited set of issues, while
trying to maintain good relations with Washington in other areas. As long as the
differences do not become too great, these frictions are part of the normal give-and-take
of international life. Even in these relatively benign contexts, however, other countries
1
Interview available at
www.pbs.org/wgbh.pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interview.short.html
. For
background, see Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War for Kosovo (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).
|
|
 Convention | | Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
