(Page 29 of 51) - Can the United States Be Balanced? If So, How? authored by Walt, Stephen.

landmines and the statute establishing an International Criminal Court. U.S. opposition
to these initiatives has not prevented other states from working to bring them to life,
paying less and less attention to U.S. concerns as they proceed. According to one
observer of the Rome negotiations on the criminal court statute, “the other delegations
felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the United States; they believed that the
United States would never be satisfied. . .and ultimately would never sign the Treaty. .
.[so they] decided to go ahead with [the] proposed compromise package.”

Over time,

the basic principles that underlie these conventions may take on a life of their own,
gradually molding prevailing legal practice and normative understandings.

Indeed, this

is probably the main reason why the Bush administration has gone to such lengths to
weaken and discredit the ICC, for if the ICC becomes a legitimate and effective part of
the international legal order, the United States will have even less ability to shape its
future evolution and the costs of remaining aloof will increase.

These examples remind us that the United States is not omnipotent, and that the

rest of humanity can and does impose certain constraints on the exercise of American
will. Nonetheless, in an era of primacy, the ability of other states to “bind” the United
States is limited. Because the United States does not need allies as much as it did during
the Cold War, and because U.S. leaders see freedom of action as essential to defending
vital U.S. interests, they are less willing to bind themselves within formal international
institutions and loathe to give up autonomy on critical issues of national security. In the
more mundane, day-to-day areas of international affairs, however, the United States is
bound to abide by a broad set of regulatory norms that are easier to follow than to defy or
dismantle, even when defiance might be tempting in the short-term.

ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES

When seeking to resist a much more powerful opponent, the weaker side should

not try to beat the stronger power at its own game. If forced to compete with Tiger
Woods, for example, a wise opponent would pick virtually any activity other than golf.
And if forced to compete with Tiger at golf, most of us would be better off staying on a
putting green rather than a driving range. We would still lose, but at least we’d have a
chance.

The same logic applies for weak states (or non-state actors) who find themselves

facing the overwhelming power of the United States. Instead of getting into a direct test
of strength with the United States, or trying to beat the United States at the things that it
does best, weaker actors will try to shift the competition into areas where they enjoy a
relatively better position. As the 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy noted, “because of
our dominance in the conventional military arena, adversaries who challenge the United

See Cherif A. Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International

Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal 32, no. 3 (1999), p. 457.

As one observer notes regarding the ICC: “its significance extends beyond the institutionalization of

international criminal responsibility for individuals: it touches on the kinds of world order that is perceived
to exist.” And by opposing the ICC, “the United States has proclaimed its intention to pursue a different
type of world order. . .that leaves more room for unilateralism.” See Georg Nolte, “The United States and
the International Criminal Court,” in Malone and Khong, Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 72.