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Can the United States Be Balanced? If So, How?
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cannot go it alone in every arena. The United States cannot limit the spread of nuclear technology without active cooperation from a wide array of other countries. The United States could not have brought peace to the Balkans without active participation from our NATO allies, and it has found it impossible to restore order and rebuild both Afghanistan and Iraq without obtaining tangible support from other countries. The United States cannot complete new rounds of tariff reductions to facilitate global trade and increase U.S. economic prosperity without the consent of a broad coalition of developed and developing countries. Most obviously, the United States cannot confront the challenge of international terrorism without sustained and enthusiastic cooperation from many other countries. In each of these areas—and many others—going it alone is not an effective option.
Why, then, does legitimacy matter? It matters because America’s ability to elicit
active cooperation from other states is impaired when others see the U.S. position of primacy—and the policies the United States is using that position to pursue—as undesirable, short-sighted, or morally dubious. In particular, foreign governments will find it more difficult to support U.S. policy when their own populations regard the United States (and its actions) as inherently illegitimate or questionable. If international diplomacy were confined to the maneuvers of foreign offices and ruling elites—as it was in the classical era of European “cabinet diplomacy,” then public perceptions of international legitimacy might not matter very much. Today, however, most governments—and especially the governments of the most powerful states—must maintain popular support in order to keep themselves in power. And because people around the world have far greater access to information—through media, the Internet, the activities of NGOs, etc.—their views on America’s international conduct are difficult if not impossible for Washington to dictate.
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As a result, ruling elites who might themselves favor U.S. positions will find their
freedom of action constrained by public skepticism or by outright opposition. In the fall of 2002, for example, German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder won re-election by distancing himself from key elements of U.S. foreign policy-and especially the simmering confrontation with Iraq, a position that resonated strongly with the German
110
As Charles Krauthammer put it in 1990, “Why it should matter to Americans that their actions get a
Security Council nod from, say, Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of Tianenmen Square is beyond me.” Or as he later wrote: “[B]y what logic is [the UN Security Council] a repository of international morality? How does the approval of France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally in pursuit of their own interests in Iraq (largely oil and investment) confer legitimacy on an invasion?” His preferred strategy—which he termed the ‘new unilateralism’—“argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’ unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future….[which] will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism.” See his “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest, no. 70 (Winter 2002-03), pp. 11, 17.
111
As a Council on Foreign Relations task force observed in 2002: “In the past, foreign policy was often
the sole prerogative of nation-states, and it was formed through interaction between heads of state and government ministers. Today, people have far more access to information more ‘soft power’ to influence global affairs directly. . . .The information age has democratized communication by providing freedom of access to information, the ability to voice opinions, and the opportunity to enter debate. Therefore, no foreign policy can succeed without a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence people and private organizations, as well as governments.” See Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
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49
cannot go it alone in every arena. The United States cannot limit the spread of nuclear
technology without active cooperation from a wide array of other countries. The United
States could not have brought peace to the Balkans without active participation from our
NATO allies, and it has found it impossible to restore order and rebuild both Afghanistan
and Iraq without obtaining tangible support from other countries. The United States
cannot complete new rounds of tariff reductions to facilitate global trade and increase
U.S. economic prosperity without the consent of a broad coalition of developed and
developing countries. Most obviously, the United States cannot confront the challenge of
international terrorism without sustained and enthusiastic cooperation from many other
countries. In each of these areas—and many others—going it alone is not an effective
option.
Why, then, does legitimacy matter? It matters because America’s ability to elicit
active cooperation from other states is impaired when others see the U.S. position of
primacy—and the policies the United States is using that position to pursue—as
undesirable, short-sighted, or morally dubious. In particular, foreign governments will
find it more difficult to support U.S. policy when their own populations regard the United
States (and its actions) as inherently illegitimate or questionable. If international
diplomacy were confined to the maneuvers of foreign offices and ruling elites—as it was
in the classical era of European “cabinet diplomacy,” then public perceptions of
international legitimacy might not matter very much. Today, however, most
governments—and especially the governments of the most powerful states—must
maintain popular support in order to keep themselves in power. And because people
around the world have far greater access to information—through media, the Internet, the
activities of NGOs, etc.—their views on America’s international conduct are difficult if
not impossible for Washington to dictate.
111
As a result, ruling elites who might themselves favor U.S. positions will find their
freedom of action constrained by public skepticism or by outright opposition. In the fall
of 2002, for example, German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder won re-election by
distancing himself from key elements of U.S. foreign policy-and especially the
simmering confrontation with Iraq, a position that resonated strongly with the German
110
As Charles Krauthammer put it in 1990, “Why it should matter to Americans that their actions get a
Security Council nod from, say, Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of Tianenmen Square is beyond me.” Or
as he later wrote: “[B]y what logic is [the UN Security Council] a repository of international morality?
How does the approval of France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally in pursuit of their own interests
in Iraq (largely oil and investment) confer legitimacy on an invasion?” His preferred strategy—which he
termed the ‘new unilateralism’—“argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for
sustaining America’ unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future….[which] will require the aggressive
and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing
multilateralism.” See his “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest, no. 70 (Winter 2002-
03), pp. 11, 17.
111
As a Council on Foreign Relations task force observed in 2002: “In the past, foreign policy was often
the sole prerogative of nation-states, and it was formed through interaction between heads of state and
government ministers. Today, people have far more access to information more ‘soft power’ to influence
global affairs directly. . . .The information age has democratized communication by providing freedom of
access to information, the ability to voice opinions, and the opportunity to enter debate. Therefore, no
foreign policy can succeed without a sustained, coordinated capability to understand, inform, and influence
people and private organizations, as well as governments.” See Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).
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