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Can the United States Be Balanced? If So, How?
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know who did it, and prison wardens cannot punish inmates whose infractions have not yet been discovered. Similarly, the United States cannot sanction other states when it is not aware of their transgressions or unable to identify exactly who is responsible.
The ability to detect foreign resistance depends on the relative balance between
U.S. surveillance and intelligence capabilities and an opponent’s capacity for concealment and deception. In some cases, of course, defiance is impossible to conceal, as it was when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic rejected NATO’s ultimatum at the Rambouillet summit and began forcibly expelling the Albanian population from Kosovo. In other cases, however, defiance of the United States may be deliberately concealed or left inherently ambiguous. States that are trying to develop weapons of mass destruction are likely to conceal their activities, or they will claim that their nuclear programs are intended solely for legitimate peaceful purposes. Similarly, states may offer covert support for various forms of anti-Americanism, including tacit support for terrorist groups with an anti-American agenda. An even more subtle variation occurs when a foreign government takes a public position in line with U.S. preferences, but does not devote much effort or energy to implementing the agreement. Whether such regimes are “cooperating” or not depends on how much cooperation one can reasonably expect, which makes a definitive assessment of their performance more difficult.
In most cases, of course, U.S. officials will be well aware when other states are
resisting its efforts. Opposition is obvious when foreign leaders publicly complain about U.S. position, when they take actions that the United States has sought to prevent, or when they encourage other states to join them in defying U.S. wishes. U.S. intelligence services are sometimes able to provide additional evidence when states are violating prior agreements or undertaking actions contrary to U.S. preferences. U.S. leaders may underestimate both the scope and intensity of foreign opposition (if only because some states will be reluctant to declare it openly), but it is unlikely to come as a complete surprise. Will the United States Respond?
Even if the U.S. leaders know that another state is openly defying their wishes,
they may decide not to retaliate. Accordingly, other states may defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to respond, even when Washington is fully aware that another state is defying its wishes. This judgement is likely to rest on the following considerations.
First, states can oppose U.S. policies when they know that it will be costly for the
United States to retaliate, or when they know the United States does not have usable options. During the Cold War, for example, the risks of escalation made it more dangerous for the United States to threaten Soviet client states directly. This constraint helps explain why the United States never invaded North Vietnam, why Soviet allies like Syria and Iraq could resist U.S. pressure, and why India could ignore U.S. opposition to its dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. But as the recent wars in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest, the ability of the United States to threaten some regimes is much greater now than it was in the past, both because potential opponents cannot get help or protection from a rival superpower, and because U.S. armed forces are increasingly capable of projecting overwhelming force at great distances. Although the US
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5
know who did it, and prison wardens cannot punish inmates whose infractions have not
yet been discovered. Similarly, the United States cannot sanction other states when it is
not aware of their transgressions or unable to identify exactly who is responsible.
The ability to detect foreign resistance depends on the relative balance between
U.S. surveillance and intelligence capabilities and an opponent’s capacity for
concealment and deception. In some cases, of course, defiance is impossible to conceal,
as it was when Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic rejected NATO’s ultimatum at the
Rambouillet summit and began forcibly expelling the Albanian population from Kosovo.
In other cases, however, defiance of the United States may be deliberately concealed or
left inherently ambiguous. States that are trying to develop weapons of mass destruction
are likely to conceal their activities, or they will claim that their nuclear programs are
intended solely for legitimate peaceful purposes. Similarly, states may offer covert
support for various forms of anti-Americanism, including tacit support for terrorist
groups with an anti-American agenda. An even more subtle variation occurs when a
foreign government takes a public position in line with U.S. preferences, but does not
devote much effort or energy to implementing the agreement. Whether such regimes are
“cooperating” or not depends on how much cooperation one can reasonably expect,
which makes a definitive assessment of their performance more difficult.
In most cases, of course, U.S. officials will be well aware when other states are
resisting its efforts. Opposition is obvious when foreign leaders publicly complain about
U.S. position, when they take actions that the United States has sought to prevent, or
when they encourage other states to join them in defying U.S. wishes. U.S. intelligence
services are sometimes able to provide additional evidence when states are violating prior
agreements or undertaking actions contrary to U.S. preferences. U.S. leaders may
underestimate both the scope and intensity of foreign opposition (if only because some
states will be reluctant to declare it openly), but it is unlikely to come as a complete
surprise.
Will the United States Respond?
Even if the U.S. leaders know that another state is openly defying their wishes,
they may decide not to retaliate. Accordingly, other states may defy the United States if
they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to respond, even when
Washington is fully aware that another state is defying its wishes. This judgement is
likely to rest on the following considerations.
First, states can oppose U.S. policies when they know that it will be costly for the
United States to retaliate, or when they know the United States does not have usable
options. During the Cold War, for example, the risks of escalation made it more
dangerous for the United States to threaten Soviet client states directly. This constraint
helps explain why the United States never invaded North Vietnam, why Soviet allies like
Syria and Iraq could resist U.S. pressure, and why India could ignore U.S. opposition to
its dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. But as the recent wars in Serbia, Afghanistan,
and Iraq suggest, the ability of the United States to threaten some regimes is much greater
now than it was in the past, both because potential opponents cannot get help or
protection from a rival superpower, and because U.S. armed forces are increasingly
capable of projecting overwhelming force at great distances. Although the US
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