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Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Isn't Pushing Back
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Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Isn't Pushing Back
Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander
1. Introduction
Many scholars and policy analysts predicted balancing against the United States
in the wake of the Cold War. In the fifteen years since then, great powercounterbalancing failed to emerge, despite the fact that America’s preponderant poweronly increased. Over the past two years, the prospect and then onset of the American-ledinvasion of Iraq generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Someclaim that signs of traditional balancing by states – i.e., internal defense build-ups orexternal alliance formation – can already be detected. Others suggest that such “hard”balancing may not be occurring, but instead argue that we are witnessing a newphenomenon of “soft balancing,” in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S.power in ways that fall short of classic measures. But in both these versions, manybelieve the wait is over and the world is beginning to “push back,” in one way or another.
This paper argues, in contrast, that both these lines of argument are unpersuasive.
There is still no great power balancing behavior against the United States. America’snearest rivals are not ramping up defense spending to counter U.S. power, nor have thesestates sought to pool their efforts or resources for counterbalancing. We argue, further,that discussion of “soft balancing” is much ado about nothing: It is difficult to define oroperationalize the concept; the behavior typically identified by it seems identical totraditional, normal diplomatic friction; and, regardless, the specific predictions suggestedby those advancing the concept are not supported by the evidence. In fact, globalinteractions during and after the Iraq war are filled with both a great deal of stasis – asmany states leave their policies toward the U.S. fundamentally unchanged – and ironies,such as repeated requests by the United States for its allies to substantially boost theirmilitary spending and capabilities, requests which so far have gone unfilled. Moreover,U.S. relations with important regional powers like Russia, China, and India and other keystates (such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan) have actually improved inrecent years. These important and revealing events and trends are underappreciated bymany, perhaps most, analyses in search of balancing.
The lack of balancing behavior constitutes a genuine puzzle, with serious
implications both for theorizing and for foreign policy-making, and so is a puzzle worthexplaining.
The next section of this paper reviews approaches which predict balancing under
current conditions. Section 3 presents evidence that classic forms of balancing aredemonstrably not occurring. Section 4 argues that claims of soft balancing areunpersuasive, because evidence for them is poor, and especially because they rely oncriteria that cannot effectively distinguish between “soft balancing” and routinediplomatic friction. These claims are, in that sense, non-falsifiable. The final sectionsargue that balancing against the United States is not occurring because the U.S.’s post-9/11 efforts of intervention have been highly selective. U.S. policy, despite widespreadcriticism, poses a threat only to a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups.
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| | Authors: Lieber, Keir. and Alexander, Gerard. |
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Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Isn't Pushing Back
Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander
1. Introduction
Many scholars and policy analysts predicted balancing against the United States
in the wake of the Cold War. In the fifteen years since then, great power counterbalancing failed to emerge, despite the fact that America’s preponderant power only increased. Over the past two years, the prospect and then onset of the American-led invasion of Iraq generated renewed warnings of an incipient global backlash. Some claim that signs of traditional balancing by states – i.e., internal defense build-ups or external alliance formation – can already be detected. Others suggest that such “hard” balancing may not be occurring, but instead argue that we are witnessing a new phenomenon of “soft balancing,” in which states seek to undermine and restrain U.S. power in ways that fall short of classic measures. But in both these versions, many believe the wait is over and the world is beginning to “push back,” in one way or another.
This paper argues, in contrast, that both these lines of argument are unpersuasive.
There is still no great power balancing behavior against the United States. America’s nearest rivals are not ramping up defense spending to counter U.S. power, nor have these states sought to pool their efforts or resources for counterbalancing. We argue, further, that discussion of “soft balancing” is much ado about nothing: It is difficult to define or operationalize the concept; the behavior typically identified by it seems identical to traditional, normal diplomatic friction; and, regardless, the specific predictions suggested by those advancing the concept are not supported by the evidence. In fact, global interactions during and after the Iraq war are filled with both a great deal of stasis – as many states leave their policies toward the U.S. fundamentally unchanged – and ironies, such as repeated requests by the United States for its allies to substantially boost their military spending and capabilities, requests which so far have gone unfilled. Moreover, U.S. relations with important regional powers like Russia, China, and India and other key states (such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan) have actually improved in recent years. These important and revealing events and trends are underappreciated by many, perhaps most, analyses in search of balancing.
The lack of balancing behavior constitutes a genuine puzzle, with serious
implications both for theorizing and for foreign policy-making, and so is a puzzle worth explaining.
The next section of this paper reviews approaches which predict balancing under
current conditions. Section 3 presents evidence that classic forms of balancing are demonstrably not occurring. Section 4 argues that claims of soft balancing are unpersuasive, because evidence for them is poor, and especially because they rely on criteria that cannot effectively distinguish between “soft balancing” and routine diplomatic friction. These claims are, in that sense, non-falsifiable. The final sections argue that balancing against the United States is not occurring because the U.S.’s post- 9/11 efforts of intervention have been highly selective. U.S. policy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat only to a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups.
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