5 8
E.g., John Owen, “Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy; or, Benignity Is in the Eye of the
Be hold er,” an d T hom as Risse , “U.S . Power in a Liberal Sec urity Co mmunity,” bo th in Iken berry, America
Unrivaled.
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unconvincing arguments that a true “collective identity” has emerged, that shared values
and norms of trust have obviated power politics, or that the use of military force in the
service of national interests is archaic.
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Not only does the United States have a long
history of caring deeply about the global balance of power, but it also has gone to great
lengths to achieve and retain global primacy and repeatedly acted in ways that undermine
notions of deeply-rooted shared values and interests. In the wake of America’s decision
to invade Iraq, if not the record of U.S. foreign policy in the last decade, it is safe to
speculate that prominent liberals may be having second thoughts about the validity of
their own explanations.
6. America’s Focused Enmity
The major powers in the world today are not balancing against the United States
because they understand the nature of American grand strategy in the post-9/11 world.
That U.S. strategy is indeed ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous offensive
military capability, but it is highly selective and thus not plausibly broadly threatening.
Specifically, the United States is confronting the greatest threats to its existence,
interests, and power – i.e., the threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and
global terrorist organizations. Other major powers are not balancing American power
because they either want America to succeed in defeating these shared threats or are
ambivalent and understand that that they are not in America’s cross-hairs. The
Convention