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"Draining the Sea or Feeding the Fire?": The Use of Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Operations
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DRAINING THE SEA, OR FEEDING THE FIRE
MozambiqueIn 1977, in the aftermath of Mozambique’s successful bid for independence, the new single-party, Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government began instituting a
massive voluntary villagization scheme.
[148]
FRELIMO believed communal villages would be
an efficient way to manage the redistribution of scarce resources and services to the peasantry as well as urbanize and modernize the countryside, and as a useful response to internal insecurity. And indeed, at the outset, some people found the communal villages attractive. Schools, literacy classes, and health clinics were launched in some villages, and young people found village living appealing socially. It also facilitated expanded communication and the sharing of news. At the same time, even at the beginning, reactions to the villagization schemes depended largely on its effects on one's livelihood and future economic prospects. Small traders viewed themselves better off in villages, since they suddenly found themselves with a significantly larger clientele.
[149]
In contrast, as is the case in counterinsurgency campaigns, those who worked mainly on
the land and found themselves living far from their fields found villagization more difficult.
[150]
In any event, the blush was off the villagization rose fairly quickly, due to significant planning and implementation failures on the part of Mozambique’s sitting government, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). While the population’s expectations had been raised by the promise of benefits from the state, a lack of feasibility studies and of popular participation in the site-ing of the villages meant they were often poorly located in terms of water, building
materials, firewood, and distance from fields.
[151]
Increased walking time to farmers’ fields
adversely affected productivity and also differentiated economically between farmers who lived
further from or closer to their fields.
[152]
Thus in many of the new villages, people quickly
became frustrated with the lack of service provision and with FRELIMO more generally, as it
“proved incapable of fulfilling the promises of socialist modernization."
[153]
This failure to live up to expectations led to resentment of the villagization program and further antagonism towards FRELIMO, which in turn inspired support for RENAMO, the South African-backed insurgent group that fought the FRELIMO-led government in a decade long civil war that
ended in 1992.
[154]
Unsurprisingly, in those areas where people were particularly unhappy with
villagization, RENAMO found a population "with no great desire to inform on them, even an
active welcome."
[155]
For example, in the northern province of Nampula, RENAMO had its
greatest successes in those areas where villagization had been most extensive.
[156]
Villagization
also apparently led to unexpected social stratification in Mozambique, which RENAMO was able
to further exploit since FRELIMO was a Marxist regime.
[157]
Finally, support for the
file:///Users/kelly/Desktop/Greenhill-Counterinsurgency.htm (29 of 43)9/28/2004 6:23:24 AM
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| | Authors: Greenhill, Kelly. |
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DRAINING THE SEA, OR FEEDING THE FIRE
Mozambique
In 1977, in the aftermath of Mozambique’s successful bid for independence, the new single-party,
Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government began instituting a
massive voluntary villagization scheme.
FRELIMO believed communal villages would be
an efficient way to manage the redistribution of scarce resources and services to the peasantry as
well as urbanize and modernize the countryside, and as a useful response to internal insecurity.
And indeed, at the outset, some people found the communal villages attractive. Schools, literacy
classes, and health clinics were launched in some villages, and young people found village living
appealing socially. It also facilitated expanded communication and the sharing of news. At the
same time, even at the beginning, reactions to the villagization schemes depended largely on its
effects on one's livelihood and future economic prospects. Small traders viewed themselves
better off in villages, since they suddenly found themselves with a significantly larger clientele.
In contrast, as is the case in counterinsurgency campaigns, those who worked mainly on
the land and found themselves living far from their fields found villagization more difficult.
In any event, the blush was off the villagization rose fairly quickly, due to significant planning
and implementation failures on the part of Mozambique’s sitting government, the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). While the population’s expectations had been raised by
the promise of benefits from the state, a lack of feasibility studies and of popular participation in
the site-ing of the villages meant they were often poorly located in terms of water, building
materials, firewood, and distance from fields.
adversely affected productivity and also differentiated economically between farmers who lived
became frustrated with the lack of service provision and with FRELIMO more generally, as it
This failure to live up to expectations led to resentment of the villagization program and further
antagonism towards FRELIMO, which in turn inspired support for RENAMO, the South African-
backed insurgent group that fought the FRELIMO-led government in a decade long civil war that
ended in 1992.
Unsurprisingly, in those areas where people were particularly unhappy with
villagization, RENAMO found a population "with no great desire to inform on them, even an
active welcome."
For example, in the northern province of Nampula, RENAMO had its
greatest successes in those areas where villagization had been most extensive.
Villagization
also apparently led to unexpected social stratification in Mozambique, which RENAMO was able
to further exploit since FRELIMO was a Marxist regime.
Finally, support for the
file:///Users/kelly/Desktop/Greenhill-Counterinsurgency.htm (29 of 43)9/28/2004 6:23:24 AM
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