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"State Building for Future Wars: How Great Powers Balance Internally to Meet Long Term Threats
Unformatted Document Text:  of the Meiji Restoration, Japan waged two wars—the first to supplant Chinese hegemony in East Asia and the second to prevent Russia from filling the power vacuum—thus consolidating its position in the region and its place among the great powers. 1 Even when confronted with a common threat, states vary in their ability and willingness to mobilize domestic resources for defense. The creation of the mass army—the introduction of the levée en masse, an officer corps chosen on the basis of merit, organizational and tactical innovations—enabled the armies of the French Republic and Napoleon's Grande Armée to enjoy ten years of nearly unbroken battlefield victories. However, Austria, Great Britain, and Russia did not rush to emulate the French military model. Only Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, was willing to risk upheaval to fundamentally transform its military. Even then, Prussian reform efforts came relatively late. In 1794, King Frederick William II rejected proposals to institute levée en masse fearing that such a move would be "infinitely dangerous" to the internal social and political order of Prussia. It took the catastrophic defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 and the humiliating Treaty of Tilsit imposed by Napoleon to convince the king and his advisors of need to undertake sweeping military and political reforms. 2 The Puzzle These historical examples raise several questions about the mobilization of domestic resources for national security: Under what circumstances are states more likely to emulate the successful military institutions, governing practices, and technologies of another? When confronted with similarly threatening international environments, why are some states able to emulate such practices, while other states fail to do so? Under what circumstances are states more likely to create entirely new military institutions, practices, and technologies in an effort to offset the perceived advantages of rival states? Finally, when confronted with international threats and opportunities, why are some states willing and able to create efficient means to extract and mobilize greater resources from their societies, while other states will not or cannot? 3

Authors: Taliaferro, Jeffrey.
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of the Meiji Restoration, Japan waged two wars—the first to supplant Chinese hegemony in East
Asia and the second to prevent Russia from filling the power vacuum—thus consolidating its
position in the region and its place among the great powers.
Even when confronted with a common threat, states vary in their ability and willingness
to mobilize domestic resources for defense. The creation of the mass army—the introduction of
the levée en masse, an officer corps chosen on the basis of merit, organizational and tactical
innovations—enabled the armies of the French Republic and Napoleon's Grande Armée to enjoy
ten years of nearly unbroken battlefield victories. However, Austria, Great Britain, and Russia did
not rush to emulate the French military model. Only Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, was
willing to risk upheaval to fundamentally transform its military. Even then, Prussian reform
efforts came relatively late. In 1794, King Frederick William II rejected proposals to institute
levée en masse fearing that such a move would be "infinitely dangerous" to the internal social and
political order of Prussia. It took the catastrophic defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and
Auerstädt in 1806 and the humiliating Treaty of Tilsit imposed by Napoleon to convince the king
and his advisors of need to undertake sweeping military and political reforms.
The Puzzle
These historical examples raise several questions about the mobilization of domestic
resources for national security: Under what circumstances are states more likely to emulate the
successful military institutions, governing practices, and technologies of another? When
confronted with similarly threatening international environments, why are some states able to
emulate such practices, while other states fail to do so? Under what circumstances are states more
likely to create entirely new military institutions, practices, and technologies in an effort to offset
the perceived advantages of rival states? Finally, when confronted with international threats and
opportunities, why are some states willing and able to create efficient means to extract and
mobilize greater resources from their societies, while other states will not or cannot?
3


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