2
Introduction
Disputes over history textbooks and religious visits have been identified as a
grave threat to Japanese-Korean relations. Many observers claim that the flaring of sharp
disputes over a new rightwing Japanese textbook published in 2001 and the paying of an
official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (honoring Japan’s war dead, including class A war
criminals) by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in August 2001 (and again in
April 2002 and January 2003) seriously destabilized the relationship between these two
“quasi-allies” of the United States. (For an analysis of this “quasi-alliance” relationship,
see Cha) According to one careful observer of Northeast Asian politics, “the US should
be concerned about the deterioration of trust between its closest allies in the eastern half
of Asia just when the challenge of North Korea looms large.”(Rozman, p 26) On the
other hand, a competing view maintains that the history factor, if not irrelevant for the
bilateral relationship between Tokyo and Seoul, has little impact on major policy
decisions. In essence, the South Koreans are said to face a choice between pragmatism
and emotion, and when push comes to shove, invariably choose the former. (see Cha)
Navigating between these two perspectives, this paper attempts a more nuanced
view of when and how history matters in Japan-ROK relations. We argue that disputes
over history per se pose little threat to the relationship status-quo, including presently
envisaged cooperation in case of a crisis over North Korea. On the other hand, the crux of
the problem is not a trade-off between emotion versus pragmatism, but trust versus
mistrust. Historically rooted Korean mistrust of Japan threatens not so much the status
quo as the prospects for deepening cooperation between the two. Although the history
issue does not threaten currently envisaged cooperation in case of a crisis involving North
Korea, this is primarily because the currently envisaged level of cooperation is extremely
modest. The thought of direct military cooperation against North Korea, especially
combat, remains all but unthinkable.
This paper distinguishes between military and historical reassurance.
1
The
former includes measures to reassure another about a nation’s non-aggressive intentions,
military doctrine, character of the military institution, and the character and quality of the
state’s control of its military. Historical reassurance, by contrast entails reassuring
1
For more on this, see Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security
Studies
11, no. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-43, esp. pp.36-40.
Convention