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Perhaps – in the light of both the necessity and the danger of the modern approach – what
is required is a blend of the two approaches; a theory that is grounded in some sense of
teleology, of true justice, and which at the same time takes account of the dynamics of
anarchy.
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Another option, of course, is to use the demonstrable utility of modern political
philosophy for IR theorizing as a way to critique Strauss’ rejection of the former, and
thereby reject Strauss’ critique. A third option is simply to reject Strauss’ analysis of
political philosophy without reference to IR theory at all, and thereby dispense with the
correlated notion that IR theory is headed for a similar crisis.
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Whichever approach one chooses, it is hoped that the relevance of Strauss’ work,
for IR theorizing, has become clearer through the argumentation of this article. More
important still, this article has attempted to clarify some of the array of connections that
exist between modern political philosophy and IR theory. IR scholars ignore these
connections at their theoretical peril, while political philosophers ignore them at risk to
their theoretical relevance. Political philosophy possesses deep wells of insight from
which IR scholars can draw, while a world of ever shrinking distances and integrating
political systems demands the participation of political philosophers in addressing key IR
questions. Furthermore, if IR theorizing is indeed headed for crisis, than a meeting of the
minds across the distance that divides the two subfields is the best possible response to
that impending challenge. If, on the other hand, this meeting fails to occur, and if
Strauss’ analysis is indeed correct, then one is free to speculate as to whether studying
“the tragedy of great power politics,” to borrow John Mearsheimer’s phrase, might not
itself become a tragic enterprise.
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Convention