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dynamics of shared ideas. That is to say, through its relationship to the philosophical project of
Jurgen Habermas, whose theory of “communicative action” is offered as a remedy to the crisis of
modernity. Ironically, by taking theoretical steps that somewhat mirror Habermas’ – although
Wendt never once mentions Habermas in the entire course of Social Theory of International
Politics – social constructivists have potentially ushered in IR’s major crisis, which matches the
crisis of modern political philosophy, which in-turn Habermas’ theory is meant to correct.
Perhaps through an explicit and more complete embrace of Habermas, therefore, social
constructivists can find a remedy to the crisis that they themselves have potentially begun
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It would be remiss to end this work without saying something about the place of Mearsheimer’s
theory of offensive realism and where it sits within the general scheme of things, vis-à-vis
classical political philosophy. Mearsheimer argues that because an anarchic world is so
dangerous, states will not only seek security, but will go on the offensive in search of more power,
so as to attain more security; behavior which only makes the world all the more dangerous still.
Essentially, his theory is a return to Waltz’s – and Hobbes’ – key premises, save that
Mearsheimer does not think order can actually be achieved. Hence, his book is titled The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
Interestingly, Mearsheimer’s theory and Wendt’s theory compliment each other as the
two outstanding critiques of the modern IR project. Both return to Waltzian premises and find
these premises under-theorized, but while Wendt proceeds to deconstruct the assumptions laden
in Waltz’s theory, Mearsheimer embraces them and then takes them beyond Waltz’s conservative
analysis, to their proper conclusion. Mearsheimer, in-turn, does his part in setting the scene for
Neitzschean analysis through his description of the “eternal return” of major wars, inescapable
power imperatives, etc.
Convention