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Prologue
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center towers in New York, and
the Pentagon building near Washington D.C., which resulted in the murder of several
thousand innocent civilians and massive damage to property, have had a major impact
on the world. These horrendous events have altered the usual ebb and flow of
international relations. We are witnessing drastic changes in terms of day-to-day
dealings between states in order to obstruct the worldwide network of Al-Qa’idah and
its affiliated groups. Most significant of which is the global military campaign led by the
United States aimed at physically eradicating the worldwide infrastructure of Al-Qa’ida.
While there are several other smaller fronts but thus far, the war in Afghanistan has
been the major theater of operation in this ongoing campaign.
The US led attack on Afghanistan may have removed the Taliban regime from
power, and relatively marginalized the ability of Al-Qa’ida to conduct its operations.
However, the struggle against terrorism remains far from over as the ideology of
jihadism continues unabated as a global enterprise.
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The Bush administration and its
supporters are convinced that the preponderance of offensive military power along with
defensive homeland security initiatives will alone be enough to thwart international
terrorism. This rather simplistic vision is indicative of a failure on the part of the United
States administration in realizing the essential dynamics that underscore the
phenomenon of jihadism. It is impossible for states to effectively deal with the problem
of violence perpetrated by non-state actors without a realization of the factors that
engender this type of asymmetrical warfare. The fundamental problem here is the
Convention