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A Diversionary Compliance Hypothesis of Nuclear Renunciation: The Case of South Africa
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ABSTRACT: Despite many discussions on diversionary war, few have investigated the plausibility of the opposite where leaders choose to make peace with an external adversary to divert domestic crisis. Here I propose a “diversionary-compliance” hypothesis of nuclear renunciation where leaders give up nuclear weapons to stay in power. The hypothesis is “diversionary” in that leaders have an ulterior motive of securing their jobs by “complying” with the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation. When domestic crisis threatens the leader’s tenure in a situation where the international community does not support the leadership, the leader may decide to signal friendly gestures to the international community to obtain support by renouncing nuclear weapons (diversionary-compliance) rather than going nuclear (diversionary-war). I test the hypothesis on South Africa by process tracing its nuclear history with two variables, domestic crisis and foreign pressure. Forty-five years of South Africa’s nuclear history showed that when the degrees of domestic crisis and foreign pressure were high, its nuclear posture turned dovish. Findings also showed that the U.S. had planted the atomic seed in South Africa for economic and strategic interest at the inception of the Cold War, and had sent mixed signals to Pretoria’s earlier attempt at nuclear development. South Africa’s decision to weaponize its nuclear program during 1974-1977, thus, was a natural course of events. In late 1989 to early 1990 when South Africa renounced nuclear weapons, this turnaround occurred when the apartheid regime experienced the worst legitimacy crisis in the National Party’s history. This confirms the hypothesis that the reason President de Klerk dismantled nuclear weapons was not so much his identity change or his fear of the ANC’s possession of the weapons as his anticipation of gaining international recognition to prolong his hold on the apartheid power. KEYWORDS: diversionary compliance, diversionary war, nuclear weapons, nuclear renunciation, South Africa.
After a decade since President de Klerk shocked the world by unveiling South
Africa’s nuclear history, the answer to the puzzle why South Africa had built six nuclear weapons and then secretly dismantled them remains unclear. Because giving up nuclear weapons has rarely happened in the world and it goes against the realist projection of international relations, South Africa’s nuclear renunciation is an intriguing puzzle empirically and theoretically. There have been several attempts at answering the puzzle, however, with only a few exceptions, those explanations tend to be descriptive and lack theoretical perspectives in that none offered causal hypotheses to be tested or specified under what conditions nuclear ambitious states would give up nuclear weapons.
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Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point:
Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88; Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 45-86; T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 24-40; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter
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ABSTRACT: Despite many discussions on diversionary war, few have investigated the
plausibility of the opposite where leaders choose to make peace with an external
adversary to divert domestic crisis. Here I propose a “diversionary-compliance”
hypothesis of nuclear renunciation where leaders give up nuclear weapons to stay in
power. The hypothesis is “diversionary” in that leaders have an ulterior motive of
securing their jobs by “complying” with the international norm of nuclear
nonproliferation. When domestic crisis threatens the leader’s tenure in a situation where
the international community does not support the leadership, the leader may decide to
signal friendly gestures to the international community to obtain support by renouncing
nuclear weapons (diversionary-compliance) rather than going nuclear (diversionary-
war). I test the hypothesis on South Africa by process tracing its nuclear history with two
variables, domestic crisis and foreign pressure. Forty-five years of South Africa’s
nuclear history showed that when the degrees of domestic crisis and foreign pressure
were high, its nuclear posture turned dovish. Findings also showed that the U.S. had
planted the atomic seed in South Africa for economic and strategic interest at the
inception of the Cold War, and had sent mixed signals to Pretoria’s earlier attempt at
nuclear development. South Africa’s decision to weaponize its nuclear program during
1974-1977, thus, was a natural course of events. In late 1989 to early 1990 when South
Africa renounced nuclear weapons, this turnaround occurred when the apartheid regime
experienced the worst legitimacy crisis in the National Party’s history. This confirms the
hypothesis that the reason President de Klerk dismantled nuclear weapons was not so
much his identity change or his fear of the ANC’s possession of the weapons as his
anticipation of gaining international recognition to prolong his hold on the apartheid
power.
KEYWORDS: diversionary compliance, diversionary war, nuclear weapons, nuclear
renunciation, South Africa.
After a decade since President de Klerk shocked the world by unveiling South
Africa’s nuclear history, the answer to the puzzle why South Africa had built six nuclear
weapons and then secretly dismantled them remains unclear. Because giving up nuclear
weapons has rarely happened in the world and it goes against the realist projection of
international relations, South Africa’s nuclear renunciation is an intriguing puzzle
empirically and theoretically. There have been several attempts at answering the puzzle,
however, with only a few exceptions, those explanations tend to be descriptive and lack
theoretical perspectives in that none offered causal hypotheses to be tested or specified
under what conditions nuclear ambitious states would give up nuclear weapons.
1
Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point:
Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Ariel
E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3
(Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88; Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,”
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 45-86; T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why
Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); William J. Long and
Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,”
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 24-40; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build
Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter
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