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A Diversionary Compliance Hypothesis of Nuclear Renunciation: The Case of South Africa
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in the gap, this paper provides a diversionary-compliance hypothesis and tests it on South Africa which suits the crucial case for nuclear renunciation.
2
The diversionary-compliance hypothesis posits that nuclear ambitious states give
up nuclear weapons when the leaders of the states are under severe domestic crisis that threatens their job security.
3
Under such a domestic legitimacy crisis the leaders attempt
to obtain external support by complying with the international norms that give the most social back-patting from the international community.
4
Why the leaders choose to
comply with the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation rather than go openly nuclear and stir up the nationalist sentiment is the key difference between diversionary-compliance and diversionary-war.
5
The choice between the two lies in whether the
leadership or the source of domestic crisis is supported by the international community or not. Once the path is set on diversionary-compliance, renouncing nuclear weapons is a sure way of receiving welcome from the international community, particularly after the establishment of the NPT.
An underlying assumption here is that a nuclear weapon has become so valuable,
especially for the Third World states, not simply because it is the most powerful weapon ever developed in history, but also because the accompanying political externalities provide additional benefits. Thus, nuclear weapons are not likely to be surrendered unless the top decision maker’s (political) life is in jeopardy. Simply put, as there is no worthwhile reward commensurate with giving up nuclear weapons for the nuclear ambitious states, only when the stake of survival under domestic crisis boils down to the leader’s political life would the weapons be abolished.
This diversionary-compliance hypothesis has significance for explaining nuclear
renunciation in two ways. First, it introduces a reversal of the diversionary-war argument by suggesting a possibility of making peace with an external adversary to divert domestic
1996/97), pp. 54-86; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995); Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-69.
2
For case studies, Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” in Fred I.
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), pp. 79-137; and John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 341-54.
3
The core argument is inspired by Steven David’s “omnibalancing” theory of Third World
alignment. Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-56. The diversionary-compliance has two hypotheses: Hypothesis One: Ceteris paribus nuclear-ambitious states are likely to renounce nuclear weapons when their leaders face domestic legitimacy crisis of losing office. Hypothesis Two: Ceteris paribus nuclear-ambitious states are likely to renounce nuclear weapons when the nuclear nonproliferation norm pressure is higher than that of others. Measurement of variables is in the appendix. Due to space limit, the logic of the argument will be presented at the conference.
4
For social reward, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social
Environments,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 487-515.
5
Diversionary-war theory or scapegoat theory (internal conflict leads to external war) is based on
the ingroup/outgroup hypothesis that claims external pressure promotes internal cohesion. For the theories, see Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259-88; Birger Heldt, “The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories, and Systemic Studies,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 101-6; Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 2004), pp. 555-70.
3
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in the gap, this paper provides a diversionary-compliance hypothesis and tests it on South
Africa which suits the crucial case for nuclear renunciation.
The diversionary-compliance hypothesis posits that nuclear ambitious states give
to obtain external support by complying with the international norms that give the most
social back-patting from the international community.
Why the leaders choose to
comply with the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation rather than go openly
nuclear and stir up the nationalist sentiment is the key difference between diversionary-
compliance and diversionary-war.
leadership or the source of domestic crisis is supported by the international community or
not. Once the path is set on diversionary-compliance, renouncing nuclear weapons is a
sure way of receiving welcome from the international community, particularly after the
establishment of the NPT.
An underlying assumption here is that a nuclear weapon has become so valuable,
especially for the Third World states, not simply because it is the most powerful weapon
ever developed in history, but also because the accompanying political externalities
provide additional benefits. Thus, nuclear weapons are not likely to be surrendered
unless the top decision maker’s (political) life is in jeopardy. Simply put, as there is no
worthwhile reward commensurate with giving up nuclear weapons for the nuclear
ambitious states, only when the stake of survival under domestic crisis boils down to the
leader’s political life would the weapons be abolished.
This diversionary-compliance hypothesis has significance for explaining nuclear
renunciation in two ways. First, it introduces a reversal of the diversionary-war argument
by suggesting a possibility of making peace with an external adversary to divert domestic
1996/97), pp. 54-86; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995); Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of
Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-69.
2
For case studies, Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” in Fred I.
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), pp. 79-137; and John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It
Good for?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 341-54.
3
The core argument is inspired by Steven David’s “omnibalancing” theory of Third World
alignment. Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January
1991), pp. 233-56. The diversionary-compliance has two hypotheses: Hypothesis One: Ceteris paribus
nuclear-ambitious states are likely to renounce nuclear weapons when their leaders face domestic
legitimacy crisis of losing office. Hypothesis Two: Ceteris paribus nuclear-ambitious states are likely to
renounce nuclear weapons when the nuclear nonproliferation norm pressure is higher than that of others.
Measurement of variables is in the appendix. Due to space limit, the logic of the argument will be
presented at the conference.
4
For social reward, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social
Environments,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 487-515.
5
Diversionary-war theory or scapegoat theory (internal conflict leads to external war) is based on
the ingroup/outgroup hypothesis that claims external pressure promotes internal cohesion. For the theories,
see Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of
War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259-88; Birger Heldt, “The Dependent Variable of the
Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories, and Systemic Studies,” Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 101-6; Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International
Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 2004), pp. 555-70.
3
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