29
Nazarbayev received firm security guarantees from Russia, the US, and Great Britain
86
,
as well as from China
87
.
The foregoing analysis reveals that Kazakhstan’s process of nuclear reversal was
influenced primarily by two considerations, as per the predictions of the explanatory
model. First, Kazakhstan chose to follow a cautious policy of ‘deliberate
denuclearization’ that would not excessively aggravate the regional hegemon, yet, at the
same time, would underscore Kazakhstan’s ability to pursue its own independent foreign
policy agenda. In addition, Nazarbayev’s dealings with Moscow had to carefully
complement Kazakhstan’s ambitions with respect to the West. The second determining
component of the Kazakh nuclear policy related to Nazarbayev’s goals of establishing
good relations with the West, including securing tangible security guarantees, and
extracting sizable monetary compensations for the weapons. In addition, Kazakhstan’s
objective of reforming and repairing its ailing economy, especially via an active policy of
attracting foreign investment, demanded an attainment of a nuclear-free status. The
Kazakh case also underscores the importance of strong political leadership in the
denuclearization process. Nazarbayev followed a consistent and shrewd road of nuclear
reversal that eventually secured his country consequential security guarantees. As in the
case of Ukraine, security and prosperity were not sought through nuclear weaponry, but
rather through a favorable relationship with the dominant regional players and the ability
to infuse the economy with financial assistance.
86
the security guarantees memorandum was signed in December of 1994 – see Aves, p. 192
87
ibid.
Convention