4
Introduction
As the first nuclear century drew to a close, increasing attention was paid to the
phenomenon of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear reversal
1
. Intuitively, the decision
by states to relinquish the awesome power of nuclear weapons may appear puzzling as
these arms traditionally have been thought to provide military might, political prestige
and security. A relinquishment of these weapons would leave a state with diminished
defenses against outside aggressors and would reduce its offensive arsenal – an outcome
tantamount to reduced security and power of a state. However, by the end of the 20
th
century, a handful of states had opted for a renunciation of nuclear weapons in search of
other security alternatives. In particular, three states that emerged out of the rubble of the
late Soviet Empire offer a unique opportunity to undertake a comparative study of
instances of nuclear reversal
2
. Such comparative analysis of the nuclear policies of
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan presents an occasion to theorize about the potential
causal mechanisms as well as different typologies of nuclear reversal. One of the most
surprising aspects of the foregoing analysis is that although the ultimate outcome in each
of the three cases was the same – attainment of a nuclear-free status – the process of
denuclearization varied substantially. Furthermore, while the circumstances surrounding
the nuclear outcomes in the three post-Soviet states may be considered truly unique and
exceptional due to the legacies of the communist experience, there are nonetheless
1
For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term ‘nuclear reversal’ to denote a process by which a state
renounces its nuclear status and rids itself of its nuclear arsenal. I will use this term interchangeably with
‘denuclearization’. Other scholars, however, have utilized the concept of nuclear reversal in slightly
different ways. For example, Ariel Levite conceptualized nuclear reversal as a “phenomenon in which
states embark on a path leading to nuclear weapons acquisition but subsequently reverse course..” – Levite
(2002/03). However, in the context of this paper, the three primary cases under examination never pursued
an active policy of acquiring nuclear weapons, but were rather ‘born nuclear’ when the Soviet Union
collapsed at the end of 1991.
Convention