3
down the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban.
3
Over the past decade, in fact, the
United States time and again discovered that, despite its overwhelming military
superiority against any one foe, it needed both political and military partners to manage
multiple stabilization operations after it flexed its muscle. Unfortunately, while the need
for cooperation is growing, the enormous gap in capabilities exposed during recent
interventions has aggravated mistrust and contributed to diplomatic breakdowns.
Fortunately, the future for transatlantic harmony in defense of liberal democratic
values need not be as bleak as the aggregate capability numbers suggest.
4
Neither
defense technology nor political-military influence is wholly determined by economies of
scale. Even though defense spending in European countries has actually decreased
relative to US efforts since September 11
th
, what the allies do within their smaller budgets
still matters. No case illustrates this better than the rise of Spain.
Spain only joined NATO and the European Union in the 1980s, and at that time it
needed economic assistance in order to participate. Though certain regions in Spain were
still receiving EU structural funds in 2003, after some 20 years, the country will now be
expected to wean itself from assistance as new members accede from the former Soviet
sphere of influence.
5
In contrast to the troubles experienced by several other countries
that ostensibly followed US economic prescriptions, Spain’s progress has developed
hand-in-hand with an enthusiastic turn toward democracy and a fearless embrace of
globalization. Over the last decade, particularly in the late-1990s, Spain has experienced
robust economic growth at levels similar to those enjoyed by the United States; even in
3
Shishkin (2004a).
4
Schmitt (2003); Lindley-French (2002); Alexander and Garden (2001).
5
It does, however, appear that the European Union intends to make this process substantially easier by
making the withdrawal of funds gradual (Serbeto, 2004).