2
vindicated by the critics’ failings. I also discuss the implications of the NATO expansion
debate for debates over international security in general.
Critics and Backers of NATO Expansion
President Clinton’s announcement in January 1994 that it was a question of not
whether NATO expanded but when it would expand sparked an extensive public debate
over the wisdom of NATO expansion.
2
Critics of expansion shared a number of
assumptions, but two distinct camps existed and they differed over some key effects of
expansion. First, Atlanticists argued that NATO was primarily a collective defense
organization, and that there would be little military advantage to adding more members.
The Atlanticist position was that expansion would generate considerable risks for
marginal gains. Their aim was to preserve the military prowess of the alliance.
3
As the
name implies, they were concerned about retaining trans-Atlantic military cooperation,
not with providing regional security in Central Europe. Those tasks could be left to
alternative security institutions or to bilateral arrangements. Atlanticists argued that the
military forces of post-Communist states would need to be transformed in terms of
personnel, equipment, and tactics. The new entrants would be costly to re-fit and provide
little extra military power. Moreover, their approval would be necessary to achieve
consensus on new policies. The alliance was being diluted as a cohesive military force.
Second, pacific multilateralists argued that expansion would hinder the creation
of cooperative security institutions in Central Europe while harming relations with
2
James M. Goldgeier. Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO.
(Washington, 1999), p.57.
3
Michael Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion.” Survival 37:1 (Spring 1995);
Charles Glaser, “Why NATO is Still Best.” International Security 18:1(Summer 1993); Robert
Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 113:3
(Autumn 1998)
Convention