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Managing Civil Wars: An Evaluation of Conflict Prevention Strategies in Africa
Unformatted Document Text:  De Maio 18 would generate increased levels of violence in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, home to 7.2 million persons of South Africa’s 42 million national population (Benini et al. 1998: 501). The escalation of violence in KwaZulu-Natal could have prompted other groups to engage in violent opposition that would not only undermine the peace process, but also plunge the entire country into a full-scale civil war. KwaZulu-Natal had long been the site of devastating violence in South Africa and had remained under close political observation for several years (Benini et al. 1998: 502). The unrest in KwaZulu-Natal was on one level a struggle for power and control of resources, and on another level a reaction to local conditions and disputes. Levels of conflict were especially high in January, February, and March 1994 and were believed to be largely in response to the IFP’s refusal to participate in the elections. At the center of the problem was not the desire of political leaders for greater power, but rather the constitutional place of the Zulu king, the nature and extent of the devolution of political power from central to regional governments, the issue of a double ballot, land reform, and the operations of the KwaZulu police. Effective early warning systems were in place in South Africa at the time and worked to alert the nation and international community of the increasing tensions in KwaZulu-Natal. In late 1993 and early 1994, for example, the South African political leadership sought the expertise of the research community on the likely course of political violence. In addition, the Independent Electoral Commission mandated a study to identify the high-conflict areas which could potentially pose a threat to the election process (Benini et al. 1997: 503). Thus, decisions regarding KwaZulu-Natal were made by a government that had - in addition to its own intelligence - detailed reports on the patterns of violence in the province. Based on their understanding of both the motivations for unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and the potential for mass

Authors: De Maio, Jennifer.
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background image
De Maio
18
would generate increased levels of violence in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, home to 7.2
million persons of South Africa’s 42 million national population (Benini et al. 1998: 501). The
escalation of violence in KwaZulu-Natal could have prompted other groups to engage in violent
opposition that would not only undermine the peace process, but also plunge the entire country
into a full-scale civil war.
KwaZulu-Natal had long been the site of devastating violence in South Africa and had
remained under close political observation for several years (Benini et al. 1998: 502). The unrest
in KwaZulu-Natal was on one level a struggle for power and control of resources, and on another
level a reaction to local conditions and disputes. Levels of conflict were especially high in
January, February, and March 1994 and were believed to be largely in response to the IFP’s
refusal to participate in the elections. At the center of the problem was not the desire of political
leaders for greater power, but rather the constitutional place of the Zulu king, the nature and
extent of the devolution of political power from central to regional governments, the issue of a
double ballot, land reform, and the operations of the KwaZulu police.
Effective early warning systems were in place in South Africa at the time and worked to
alert the nation and international community of the increasing tensions in KwaZulu-Natal. In late
1993 and early 1994, for example, the South African political leadership sought the expertise of
the research community on the likely course of political violence. In addition, the Independent
Electoral Commission mandated a study to identify the high-conflict areas which could
potentially pose a threat to the election process (Benini et al. 1997: 503). Thus, decisions
regarding KwaZulu-Natal were made by a government that had - in addition to its own
intelligence - detailed reports on the patterns of violence in the province. Based on their
understanding of both the motivations for unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and the potential for mass


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