De Maio
1
Introduction
Could the massive genocide in Rwanda have been prevented? Could the bloodshed in
Somalia, Kosovo, and Bosnia have been avoided? Even the slight possibility that the answer
could be “yes” warrants an investigation into what actions could have been taken to preclude the
outbreak or escalation of violence. While many are the examples of devastating civil war, there
is evidence that preventive diplomacy can and has averted conflict. If preventive diplomacy has
proven effective in at least one case, then defining the conditions for its success becomes a
critical exercise for any scholar of conflict prevention and resolution.
This paper attempts to critically assess when and why preventive diplomacy succeeds and
when it fails in an effort to develop a response-oriented framework that will address how the
international response system can be redesigned so as to act quickly to prevent or limit the
escalation of violent conflict. The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, to define preventive
diplomacy in a post Cold War context; second, to engage in a comparative case study to identify
factors that seem to explain why conflict prevention is successful in some instances and not in
others; and third, to develop a guideline of conditions that must be present in order for preventive
diplomacy
to
work.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts have become the dominant form of
contemporary violence. Groups that have historically interacted peacefully can be mobilized
against each other as the result of fundamental conflicts of interest arising from processes of
modernization, fears of group extinction, and political dynamics which produce extremist
leaders. Domestic conflicts can also become transnationalized (Keller 1997 and 1998) and
threaten regional stability and security. The dynamics of these conflicts and methods of
preventing them do not follow the rules of Cold War engagement. As a result, policymakers and
Convention