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scholars are faced with the challenge of developing new ways to deal with such conflicts before
they erupt into large-scale violence. The pervasiveness of intra-state conflict has generated a
number of studies on the causes of, consequences from, and strategies for managing intra-state
conflict, and prescriptive essays on how third parties might successfully intervene to prevent the
outbreak or escalation of violence (e.g. Jentleson 1998 and 2000; Lund 1996; Davies and Gurr
1998; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Alker et al. 2001). Few studies, however, have systematically
examined the conditions for successful preventive diplomacy.
The present discussion will address these conditions in a manner that should: a) give a
better understanding of when and why certain conflict prevention strategies succeed, and b)
develop an integrated policy-operations framework that can be adapted to individual conflicts.
The essay is divided into four main sections. I begin my analysis by defining the concept of
preventive diplomacy in the post Cold War context; I then consider the relevant literature on
intervention, and examine various types of preventive diplomacy with an emphasis on early
warning systems. In the second section, I apply my analysis to a comparative study of conflicts
in Somalia, Rwanda, and KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa focusing on how preventive diplomacy
failed to thwart bloodshed in the former two cases and succeeded in precluding the escalation of
violence in the latter. In the third, I make causal inferences based on the case study evidence and
posit that where conflict prevention worked, it was the result of informed analysis and
understanding of the situation; where it failed, there was a lack of political will and an analytical
framework. Based on this assessment, in the final section I propose conditions that when present
increase the likelihood of successful conflict prevention.
Preventive Diplomacy: Concepts and Tools
Convention