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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60107_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Favretto, Katja. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: Bias and Coercion in U.S. Mediation, 1945-1990" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60107_index.html>

Favretto, K. , 2004-09-02 "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: Bias and Coercion in U.S. Mediation, 1945-1990" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60107_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper makes two contributions to the literature on international mediation. First, I test whether a superpower’s affinity for actors enmeshed in a foreign crisis affects its choice to remain inactive in the crisis, mediate, or coerce one of the adversaries into an agreement. Next, I study the effect of the superpower’s affinity on the outcome of the crisis. Relying on a formal model and an analysis of U.S. involvement in 179 bilateral crises from 1945 to 1990, I find evidence that successful mediation is most likely when the superpower significantly favors a single crisis actor and disfavors the other. Since these are also the factors I postulate influence a state’s decision to coerce a settlement, I conclude it is useful to understand coercion and mediation not as substitute choices available to a biased superpower, but as two consecutive steps in an essentially coercive process. In this process, the biased superpower always attempts to facilitate first, and only resorts to coercion if facilitation fails.

Coding Sub-State Actors using the CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) Actor Coding Framework

The Compellence Dilemma: Non-State Actors and Coercion in International Conflict