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spoke up, and presented the group with an obvious counter. Regardless of why the
DPRK captured the ship or how much the Soviets knew about the action in advance, “Mr.
Clifford said in his view the question was whether the loss of a U.S. ship with its crew
was worth a major military confrontation with North Korea” (FRUS, 217). With this
counterpoint, the advisors adjourned and left to collect updated information on both the
specifics of the action and possible American responses.
THIRD MEETING (January 24, 1968, 1:00 p.m.)
The next meeting (this time including the President) occurred a little more than an
hour after the previous ‘advisors only’ meeting. Again, the meeting began with
confusion. After McNamara provided a short recap of events (including a reiteration the
capture was planned in advance and was probably known by the Soviet premier), the
President asked more specific questions concerning the capture (especially the actions of
the Captain, Lloyd Bucher). Immediately, two advisors contradicted each other.
Specifically, the times and radio intercepts were different: McNamara and Rostow
disagreed on when, exactly, North Korea captured the Pueblo. The President reiterated
his need to have all of the facts clear. Indeed, this was the first time Johnson knew the
captain of the Peublo had sent an SOS. To keep a clear picture of the situation in his
head, Johnson again noted his need for all of the information concerning the capture.
The meeting turned to a discussion of a confession from Captain Bucher, released
by the DPRK, implicating the CIA and the Johnson Administration for violating the
sovereignty of North Korea. Once again, advisors suggested Soviet influence. For
Convention