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INTRODUCTION
A cavalcade of pundits argue neo-conservative advisors around the President took
advantage of the September 11
th
attacks to foist their foreign policy worldview and grand
strategy upon the world. The argument suggests the President, unlike his father, is a
neophyte in the foreign policy world, allowing his advisors to push him into a war that he
did not want or need. Although several commentators disagree with this description of
events,
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the belief remains in common parlance.
While a cursory glance at the historical record indicates the importance of
advisors in the creation of military or foreign policy, few scholars focus their attention on
the exact mechanisms of this influence. By virtue of their position and necessity,
advisors hold sway. Everyday decisions and policy meetings center on the interpretation
of domestic and international events from close advisors. However, crises present an
even greater opportunity for influence. For example, Irving Janis (1989) argues within
the context of a crisis, vigilant problem-solving (i.e., systematically and carefully seeking
new information to guide decision-making) is rare since it requires too much time and
effort to accomplish. To cope with these demands, leaders turn to emotive, cognitive,
and affiliative shortcuts to make their decision. Advisors become this connection, easing
the demands of the situation, and given a chance to participate in policy making.
This paper examines the factors that allow the lone advisory voice to rise above
the cacophony and influence crisis decisions. I agree that crises present special
opportunities for powerful advisors to influence decisions of war and peace. But, in a
marketplace of ideas (such as an advisory group), how can an advisor capture the leader’s
Convention