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From then on, President Johnson would not seriously consider military action.
AFTERMATH
In December 1968, the crew of the Pueblo was released into American custody,
finally ending their nearly yearlong imprisonment and torture. The crew was released
after a confused policy solution: American negotiators signed an agreement taking
responsibility for the actions of the crew while simultaneously revoking the terms of the
agreement.
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After returning to the US, the crew became the subject of an intense
Congressional hearing. Although the hearings uncovered numerous intelligence gaffes,
the blunt of the criticism fell upon the crew, eventually placing a large amount of blame
on the Captain of the Pueblo.
This diplomatic solution arose from two sources. First, a meeting on January 29,
1968: a final consideration of military options, but half-hearted at best. By this time,
Johnson did not believe the use of military force could actually release the crew. While
the Pueblo Working Group created a list of ten possible military options (the goal of the
meeting was to update the President on the status of these options), the President did not
find any of them satisfactory. The words of Clark Clifford mimicked the thoughts of
Johnson: “Any way you look at it this incident is a loser. We cannot come out even. We
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Interestingly, the DPRK discovered the repudiation only hours before the release. North Korean
negotiators were furious at the American sleight of hand, threatening to pull out of the agreement. In the
end, the threats were merely bluster, and the release was stalled by only thirty minues.
Convention