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uncertainty dominated the briefing. A fishing boat ignored the warning shots fired by
circling Navy planes, eventually reaching a small fishing village. Importantly, the pilot
of the plane reported seeing “Caucasians” huddled on the deck. The decision makers
confronted the implication of the new intelligence: crew members may have been taken
from the ship (anchored off Koh Tang). The situation was becoming critical.
Diplomatically, the President decided to send a letter to Kurt Waldheim, the UN
Secretary General, imploring his help in releasing the prisoners. Further, Ford decided to
use military assaults. However, the question under debate became “how much force to
use, and the precise moment to use it” (Rowan 1975, 141).
Once more, the key debate was between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Noting the
severity of the situation, Kissinger wanted to hit Cambodia hard. Kissinger stressed two
things in his oration. First, heavy force was needed to send a message to Cambodia and
North Korea. And second, to avoid the Pueblo situation, this force needed to be used as
quickly as possible. Importantly, his message differed from previous arguments by
connecting two diverse elements: the failing U.S. position in the geo-strategic game, and
the analogy of the Pueblo. James Schlesinger countered Kissinger’s argument by
stressing the need to recover the ship as the ultimate goal, while diminishing the need to
send a message to the rest of the world, especially South East Asia. For Schlesinger, the
situation was simple: Cambodia captured an American vessel — a proportionate reaction
was called for, not an asymmetric one.
This debate weighed heavily on the resulting policy. Kissinger, adamant about
using a heavy hand, painted a complicated picture for Ford – and something clicked in
Ford’s head. Previously ambivalent about the use of heavy force to retrieve the crew, the
Convention