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Bargaining in the Shadow of War: Bias and Coercion in U.S. Mediation, 1945-1990
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Bargaining in the Shadow of War:
Bias and Coercion in U.S. Mediation, 1945-1990
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Katja I. Favretto
2
Department of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
4289 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, California 90095
## email not listed ##
WORK IN PROGRESS
Comments Welcome
Abstract
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on international mediation. First, I testwhether a superpower’s affinity for actors enmeshed in a foreign crisis affects its choice toremain inactive in the crisis, mediate, or coerce one of the adversaries into an agreement.Next, I study the effect of the superpower’s affinity on the outcome of the crisis. Relying on aformal model and an analysis of U.S. involvement in 179 bilateral crises from 1945 to 1990, Ifind evidence that successful mediation is most likely when the superpower significantlyfavors a single crisis actor and disfavors the other. Since these are also the factors I postulateinfluence a state’s decision to coerce a settlement, I conclude it is useful to understandcoercion and mediation not as substitute choices available to a biased superpower, but as twoconsecutive steps in an essentially coercive process. In this process, the biased superpoweralways attempts to facilitate first, and only resorts to coercion if facilitation fails.
1
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-
September 5, 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
2
I am grateful to Ken Schultz and Barry O’Neill for comments, guidance and advice. I would also like to thank
Lisa Blaydes, Shuhei Kurizaki and Jana von Stein for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are my own.
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| | Authors: Favretto, Katja. |
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Bargaining in the Shadow of War:
Katja I. Favretto
Department of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
4289 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, California 90095
## email not listed ##
WORK IN PROGRESS
Comments Welcome
Abstract
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on international mediation. First, I test
whether a superpower’s affinity for actors enmeshed in a foreign crisis affects its choice to
remain inactive in the crisis, mediate, or coerce one of the adversaries into an agreement.
Next, I study the effect of the superpower’s affinity on the outcome of the crisis. Relying on a
formal model and an analysis of U.S. involvement in 179 bilateral crises from 1945 to 1990, I
find evidence that successful mediation is most likely when the superpower significantly
favors a single crisis actor and disfavors the other. Since these are also the factors I postulate
influence a state’s decision to coerce a settlement, I conclude it is useful to understand
coercion and mediation not as substitute choices available to a biased superpower, but as two
consecutive steps in an essentially coercive process. In this process, the biased superpower
always attempts to facilitate first, and only resorts to coercion if facilitation fails.
1
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-
September 5, 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
2
I am grateful to Ken Schultz and Barry O’Neill for comments, guidance and advice. I would also like to thank
Lisa Blaydes, Shuhei Kurizaki and Jana von Stein for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are my own.
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