1
When Bosnian Serbs first saw the proposed new map of Bosnia at the 1995 peace
accords in Dayton, Ohio, they refused to accept it even though their representative Slobodan
Milosevic had already agreed to the version that appeared before them. After weeks of
fruitless bargaining, the new map was the only settlement that representatives of all three
ethnic groups found somewhat acceptable, and the adversaries appeared closest to an
agreement since the beginning of the war. Surprised by the Serbian delegation’s reaction,
American negotiators were concerned that they might not obtain the signatures required to
secure a settlement, and that an intense, month-long mediation effort at Dayton would fail.
But Milosevic assured the U.S. team that he would get everyone to sign. When the American
negotiators asked why the Serb delegation was reluctant to accept the terms, Milosevic
laughed, “Because they are in a coma after seeing the map.”
The Serbs eventually followed Milosevic’s lead and made the concessions their
adversaries and the United States had requested of them, but the exact content of American
involvement in the talks remains unclear. It is apparent the United States was unsympathetic
to the Serbs, whom it held responsible for most of the bloodshed that occurred after
by means of mediation or coercion. The initiation of U.S. mediation in Bosnia was clearly
coercive because the United States led a NATO effort to bomb Bosnian Serb positions in
order to bolster the diplomatic process. On the other hand, the road to peace thereafter
appeared to be a facilitated one. No side was explicitly ordered to agree on particular
settlement terms, and the United States committed itself to a large diplomatic effort, hosting
3
For a detailed account, see Holbrooke 1999, 310.
4
After Bosnian Serb forces held UN peacekeepers hostage and slaughtered 7,000 civilians in Srebrenica,
Bosnian Serbs became viewed as the main aggressors in the conflict. U.S. bias against the Serbs was evident in
the superpower’s tacit acceptance of Tudjman’s Oluja campaign, during which an estimated 100,000 Serbs were
expelled from their homes and many were killed. At that time, State Department officials made it clear to
Convention