28
variables are included (see Table 2).
likely to attempt facilitation in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, indicating that the United
States’ intervention calculus may be related to its affinity for or bias against states belonging
to a specific region. A similar finding emerges in the multinomial logit analysis of the
previous section. Since I already interpret the behavior of regional variables there, I discuss
them briefly in the next paragraph and devote the following few pages to the effects of
minimum and delta bias.
As in the multinomial logit analysis, the present data reveal that attempted facilitation
is expected to occur most frequently in crises taking place in Europe, Asia and the Middle
East. In the years captured by the data, the Unites States has exhibited a high affinity for most
European states, and this is consistent with Sequential Hypothesis 3, which predicts a greater
The United States has also
maintained historically important strategic interests in the Middle East and Asia. However,
the superpower has considered some states in these regions friends and seen others as
enemies. Sequential Hypothesis 3 postulates that the United States attempts facilitation when
it significantly favors one crisis actor or when its affinity for both adversaries is high.
Therefore, the finding that Middle Eastern and Asian conflicts attract superpower attention,
whether involving two friends or an enemy and a friend, is consistent with Sequential
Hypothesis 3.
24
This finding is consistent with the results obtained in the multinomial logit regression from the previous
section. The current model differs from the first one merely in that original coercion and facilitation cases are
here combined and treated as facilitation.
25
The United States, for instance, helped facilitate in the Cod War between Britain and Iceland. A notable
exception includes the disputes involving several Eastern European states and the Soviet Union after World War
II on the issue of communism. However, U.S. inaction can be attributed to the fact that another superpower was
a crisis actor in these disputes, and the United States’ ability to prevail in a possible confrontation was
diminished.
26
This is consistent with the findings of the previous section, which indicated that the United States was highly
likely to facilitate and coerce in Middle Eastern and Asian crises.
Convention