8
1999, 2001, Smith 1996a, 1996b, 1998). Therefore, facilitation is the preferred way of
achieving one’s foreign policy aims during foreign intervention.
In the next two sections, I present two competing ways of conceptualizing U.S.
facilitation and coercion. The first is based on the assumption that the United States makes a
single choice at the onset of a potential intervention: to remain inactive, to facilitate, or to
coerce. The second perspective supposes that the superpower first decides whether or not to
intervene, attempts facilitation next, and resorts to coercion only if mediation fails. In reality,
both approaches represent extreme generalizations of mediator behavior, but they are useful to
scholars because the real interaction most likely lies somewhere in between. For instance, it is
problematic to assume that all instances of U.S. coercion are a result of previous facilitation
failures, particularly since some decisions to coerce are made swiftly in order to prevail in
rapidly unfolding crises or because crisis characteristics suggest American facilitation is
unlikely to succeed. However, it is also problematic to ignore that intervention might be a
sequential process that begins with facilitation and ends in coercion because the magnitude of
American power always bears some implication of a military threat (Kleiboer 2002, Touval
1992). I argue that the loss of explanatory power that results from ignoring this phenomenon
may very well be worse than the bias that results from considering all coercive cases a
consequence of failed facilitation.
2
Mediation and Coercion as Substitutes
Before I illustrate my proposed sequential process of superpower intervention, it is
useful to consider the alternative approach, whereby inaction, facilitation and coercion
represent substitute options available to the superpower before it decides to make a move. It is
important for mediation research to consider alternative intervention options because state
Convention