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Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games and the 2003 US-Iraq War

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Abstract:

We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat three variations of the game – the complete information game, the one-sided information game, and the two-sided information game. We employ sequential decision theory to analyze the games of incomplete information. Specifically, we examine the behavior of Challenger first using a von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule and then compare that to Challenger’s behavior under a Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. The formal results show that given the right combination of outcome valuations and probability values and weightings, a Challenger employing the Kahneman-Tversky decision rule will make choices that are reversed from those made under the von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule. We also claim that these reversals in Challenger’s behavior occur in the game of two-sided incomplete information. In the application section, we illustrate the explanatory power of these models via analyses of the 2003 US-Iraq War.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

v (208), challeng (201), p (178), war (146), defend (133), acq (118), game (90), 1 (86), threaten (85), hard (80), sq (77), decis (75), soft (66), rogu (53), inform (51), cap (51), resist (44), theori (44), probabl (42), side (39), incomplet (38),

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sequential analysis, deterrence games, Iraq
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Name: American Political Science Association
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MLA Citation:

Carlson, Lisa. and Dacey, Raymond. "Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games and the 2003 US-Iraq War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60163_index.html>

APA Citation:

Carlson, L. and Dacey, R. , 2004-09-02 "Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games and the 2003 US-Iraq War" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60163_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat three variations of the game – the complete information game, the one-sided information game, and the two-sided information game. We employ sequential decision theory to analyze the games of incomplete information. Specifically, we examine the behavior of Challenger first using a von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule and then compare that to Challenger’s behavior under a Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. The formal results show that given the right combination of outcome valuations and probability values and weightings, a Challenger employing the Kahneman-Tversky decision rule will make choices that are reversed from those made under the von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule. We also claim that these reversals in Challenger’s behavior occur in the game of two-sided incomplete information. In the application section, we illustrate the explanatory power of these models via analyses of the 2003 US-Iraq War.

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Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: .pdf
Page count: 40
Word count: 6752
Text sample:
Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games and the 2003 US-Iraq War Lisa J. Carlson Department of Political Science University of Idaho Moscow Idaho 83844-3165 lcarl@uidaho.edu Raymond Dacey College of Business and Economics University of Idaho Moscow Idaho 83844-3161 rdacey@uidaho.edu Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association September 2 ­ September 5 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. ABSTRACT We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat three
Defender gives in SQ Challenger does not threaten 38 Figure 11 ­ The Decision Problem for a Hard or Rogue Challenger Under two-Sided Incomplete Information Defender resists WAR p+(1-p)P Challenger threatens (1-p)(1-P) ACQ Defender gives in SQ Challenger does not threaten 39


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