Author's Keywords: Multilateral treaty; dispute resolution; fallback bargaining; voting, environment	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60164_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Brams, Steven., Kilgour, Marc. and Sanver, Remzi. "A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60164_index.html>

Brams, S. J., Kilgour, M. and Sanver, R. , 2004-09-02 "A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60164_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: A procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties, based on “fallback bargaining,” is proposed. The compromise it finds minimizes the maximum distance, called the Hamming distance, between it and the top preferences of all players. This compromise may differ from the compromise produced by the usual procedure—voting on each treaty provision—which minimizes the sum of distances. The proposed procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing, inducing players to be truthful in expressing their preferences. The application of the procedure requires that issues be of more or less equal significance to countries and that they be as independent as possible. Applying the procedure to oil-pollution control negotiations among 32 countries in 1954 yields six compromise outcomes, all different from that produced by the usual procedure. Approval voting is suggested as a way to break ties among the compromise outcomes.

Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference

Voting Systems That Combine Approval and Preference

Domestic Veto Players and Trade Liberalization: the United States, the European Union, and the Cairns Group Negotiating Positions from the GATT Uruguay Round to the WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting