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Abstract
A procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties, based on “fallback
bargaining,” is proposed. The compromise it finds minimizes the maximum distance,
called the Hamming distance, between it and the top preferences of all players. This
compromise may differ from the compromise produced by the usual procedure—voting
on each treaty provision—which minimizes the sum of distances. The proposed
procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing, inducing players to be truthful in
expressing their preferences.
The application of the procedure requires that issues be of more or less equal
significance to countries and that they be as independent as possible. Applying the
procedure to oil-pollution control negotiations among 32 countries in 1954 yields six
compromise outcomes, all different from that produced by the usual procedure. Approval
voting is suggested as a way to break ties among the compromise outcomes.
Keywords: Multilateral treaty; dispute resolution; fallback bargaining; voting;
environment.