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A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties
1. Introduction
In this paper we propose a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral
treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties.
By “close” we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of
any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is
relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have
to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.
The procedure is different from the usual method for reaching an agreement in
multilateral treaty negotiations. Normally states vote separately on each provision of a
treaty, often starting from a “single negotiating text.”
1
A provision is included in the
treaty if a simple or qualified majority—or sometimes all states—supports it; otherwise,
it is excluded. If provisions are included in a treaty that are not approved by all states,
then those states that do not get their way on provisions they consider important might be
quite frustrated—and unwilling either to sign the treaty or to abide by its terms.
Thereby a large majority of states may agree to and achieve a treaty far removed
from the ideal of one or more states. By contrast, if the votes for and against every
provision are aggregated in a different way, a better compromise—one that leaves no
state too aggrieved—may be found.
Our focus is in on aggregating votes, which is appropriate when negotiations occur
in the shadow of voting. That is, the parties to a treaty, when they decide what provisions
to propose, must consider how they will be viewed when it comes time to vote on them.
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The extensive use of such a text in the Law of the Sea negotiations is discussed in Sebenius (1984).
Convention