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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60181_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Gochal, Joseph. and Levy, Jack. "Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60181_index.html>

Gochal, J. and Levy, J. , 2004-09-02 "Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60181_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: We examine all Bayesian equilibria of a large class of bargaining games with shifting power. Three types of one-sided asymmetric information are considered in isolation: costs of fighting, initial power, and the speed of the shift. Using incentive compatibility and the revelation principle, we characterize equilibria in terms of how the unconditional probability of war and the conditional expected time of war vary as functions of the privately known piece of information. Doing so allows us to establish a set findings independent of assumptions concerning the sequence of moves in any particular game. As such, our results provide a foundation on which to build more specific research by highlighting what relationships must and which cannot hold in any equilibrium.

The Security Strategies of the European Union and the United States as Global Actors: Shifts and Connections in Culture, Function and Power. The Case of the ESDP

Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games