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Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games
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| | Unformatted Document Text:
Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining
Games
∗
Joseph Gochal
joseph.## email not listed ##
Department of Politics
New York University
726 Broadway, Seventh Floor
New York, NY 10003-6806
Jack S. Levy
## email not listed ##
Department of Political Science
Rutgers University
89 George Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1411
August 20, 2004
Abstract
We examine all Bayesian equilibria of a large class of bargaining games with shifting
power. Three types of one-sided asymmetric information are considered in isolation: costsof fighting, initial power, and the speed of the shift. Using incentive compatibility and therevelation principle, we characterize equilibria in terms of how the unconditional probabilityof war and the conditional expected time of war vary as functions of the privately known pieceof information. Doing so allows us to establish a set findings independent of assumptionsconcerning the sequence of moves in any particular game. As such, our results provide afoundation on which to build more specific research by highlighting what relationships mustand which cannot hold in any equilibrium.
∗
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 -
September 5, 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
1
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| | Authors: Gochal, Joseph. and Levy, Jack. |
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|
Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining
Games
∗
Joseph Gochal
joseph.## email not listed ##
Department of Politics
New York University
726 Broadway, Seventh Floor
New York, NY 10003-6806
Jack S. Levy
## email not listed ##
Department of Political Science
Rutgers University
89 George Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1411
August 20, 2004
Abstract
We examine all Bayesian equilibria of a large class of bargaining games with shifting
power. Three types of one-sided asymmetric information are considered in isolation: costs
of fighting, initial power, and the speed of the shift. Using incentive compatibility and the
revelation principle, we characterize equilibria in terms of how the unconditional probability
of war and the conditional expected time of war vary as functions of the privately known piece
of information. Doing so allows us to establish a set findings independent of assumptions
concerning the sequence of moves in any particular game. As such, our results provide a
foundation on which to build more specific research by highlighting what relationships must
and which cannot hold in any equilibrium.
∗
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 -
September 5, 2004. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
1
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